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| 1 |
ID:
189953
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| 2 |
ID:
122606
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
I needs to be emphasized that the polish government's legal commitment to allocate 1.95% of the GDP to defence remains the corner stone of the country defence policy.
On the 7th March 2012 President Bronslaw Komorwski signed the state budget. The budget allocates PLN 29.2 Billion (US$8.66 Billion) to the MoND, Namely 7% more than was planned in 2011. Out of the MoND's budget PLN 7.13 Billion, or 24.4 % was allocated to material expenditures" equipment procurement, R&D modernization, NATO and EU investment, ammunition, and joint programmes such as the NAPMO, NSAC and MUSIS.
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| 3 |
ID:
130667
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article focuses on tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the need to develop an effective defense against drone attacks. Existing weapons and ways to defend against drones are presented. Problems discussed include challenges in detecting and destroying small size UAV's or drones. Options for defending against tactical drones including the use of laser as weapon, powerful electromagnetic impulses that disable drone equipment and drone hunter-killers are also presented.
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| 4 |
ID:
130342
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the U.S. government winds up an interagency review of rules governing the export of large drones, the conflicting goals of nonproliferation and commerce are creating a new test of the 27-year-old Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Observers do not expect big changes to the MTCR, which seeks to prevent the proliferation of unmanned systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The MTCR, a voluntary arrangement that now includes 34 countries, originally was intended to curb the spread of ballistic missiles and unmanned vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In 1993 it was amended to control systems carrying any weapons of mass destruction. It has become Washington's chief tool for controlling the spread of armed drones. "It's quite unlikely that we will see any radical change in the MTCR," Eric McClafferty, an attorney at Kelley Drye and Warren, a law firm in Washington that represents UAV manufacturers, said in a March 19 interview. "That said, there's a lot of pressure on the U.S. government to liberalize controls to make sure the U.S. doesn't get left behind in this market." The conflict has played out in a series of closed-door meetings over the last two months among the State, Defense, and Commerce departments as officials seek to update U.S. policy toward the burgeoning UAV market. Industry representatives have made their views known via technical committees that advise policymakers in these departments. "It's a pretty contentious fight" between the State Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and the Pentagon's Defense Technology Security Administration, said Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, in a March 17 interview. The State Department says that "if you pull at the thread of MTCR, you will weaken the nonproliferation regime as a whole. The other side says the international market is going to supply these UAVs anyway," Zenko said. The heart of the issue is what kind of UAVs U.S. manufacturers can sell overseas. The MTCR imposes a "presumption of denial" for the export of so-called Category 1 UAV's, which are drones that can travel more than 300 kilometers with a payload of more than 500 kilograms. Drones that do not have those capabilities are classified as Category 2 UAVs and are not subject to such restrictive criteria. Two drones currently classified as Category 1-the Reaper, formerly known as the Predator, and the Global Hawk-have played a central role in U.S. aerial attacks on suspected Islamic militants in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Washington has approved the sale of an armed drone to only one country, the United Kingdom, although unarmed versions of these drones have been sold to Italy and South Korea.
The stakes of the MTCR review process are large politically and economically, observers say.
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| 5 |
ID:
130676
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article discusses procedures for identifying the type and nationality of aerial vehicles to enhance effectiveness of airspace control during conflict situations. Capabilities of optoelectronic devices to gather information on class and type of aircraft are discussed. Images from a combination of optical detection instruments and radar obtained through experimental observations are presented to illustrate improvements possible to the image quality.
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| 6 |
ID:
137991
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| 7 |
ID:
071522
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| 8 |
ID:
115558
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| 9 |
ID:
131189
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
NATO must decide this year on whether and how to replace its against fleet of Boeing E-3 sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, allied officials have told HIS Jane's.
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| 10 |
ID:
179510
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Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and their applicability at sea now dominate debates about the future of naval operations. This article examines the extent to which such technologies, including autonomous and unmanned weapon systems and artificial intelligence, will disrupt naval warfare. Using two case studies, the South China Sea and the Baltic Sea, this article finds that in the key operational output of attaining sea control these technologies will not disrupt naval warfare. While they may intensify the competition between the operational attributes of detection, stealth, range and lethality, they will ultimately sustain existing understandings of seapower and its strategic effects.
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| 11 |
ID:
170861
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| 12 |
ID:
130658
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article discusses network centrics technologies and their application to warfare which would integrate all forces sand weapons in a common information environment in combat. Topics discussed include the origins of the concept of network-centric warfare, the assessment of a hypothetical adversary capable of network-centric technologies, and trends in common information environment during warfare
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| 13 |
ID:
128131
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There are a number of theories and definitions of asymmetric warfare but most definitions are inadequate to fully describe the diverse characteristics of asymmetrical warfare, because of diverse forms asymmetric warfare can take it is still obscure. It can hold many surprises and has many unexpected formats and designs. It can hold many surprises fully explored. It is not easy to formulate any standard course of action that can be employed to fight diverse forms of asymmetrical wars. There are clear indications that the current doctrinal concepts of combat have been ineffective in meeting the challenges of asymmetric wars. It is necessary to initiate a comprehensive review of the basic concepts and theories that underpin the doctrines of fighting asymmetrical wars today.
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| 14 |
ID:
138661
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