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| 1 |
ID:
181991
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| Summary/Abstract |
Was the expansion of overseas U.S. bases from the late nineteenth century to the present driven by imperial impulses or strategic principles? Recent scholarship reflects a diverse set of perspectives on the history and politics of overseas U.S. military bases. To evaluate existing claims about the evolution and logic of overseas U.S. bases, we establish a conceptual framework for understanding an “empire of bases” based on motivational and relational attributes of basing policy. We then examine different historical junctures in the development of the U.S. overseas base network and analyze macro-level trends in basing policy.
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| 2 |
ID:
192152
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In meetings with their US counterparts, South Korean policymakers have repeatedly raised the same question: can South Korea trust the United States? The answer is a resounding and increasingly exasperated “yes” from American officials and experts. However, doubts have surfaced over the past year on the Korean side regarding US commitments to the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, despite Seoul and Washington publicly reaffirming the ironclad nature of their 70-year alliance. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s April 2023 state visit to Washington DC and his summit meeting with President Joseph Biden, their second in as many years, was aimed at demonstrating the importance of the US-ROK alliance to both Americans and South Koreans, while also acknowledging South Korea’s growing role in the Indo-Pacific. Although the Yoon-Biden summit may have been meaningful in helping the two governments and their respective domestic audiences think about the future value of the alliance, it did not necessarily resolve some of the underlying bilateral tensions.
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| 3 |
ID:
174856
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After a decade of vibrant scholarly and political discourse regarding the prospects of East Asian integration, the narrative of regionalism has lost its luster in favor of a darker regional narrative. Has the idea of East Asian regionalism come to pass, and if so, what explains the decline in the narrative of Asian regionalism both as a policy idea and as a research program? After providing empirical evidence tracking the rise and decline in scholarly publications and news articles regarding Asian regionalism, I present several plausible reasons explaining this decline. Among them, the perceived shift in Chinese strategic behavior, and in turn, the adoption of more pragmatic interpretations of Asian security practices – one defined by power balancing and institutional rivalry rather than community building – appears to have struck a major blow to the East Asia regional project.
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| 4 |
ID:
170912
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| 5 |
ID:
165210
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| 6 |
ID:
191871
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Despite a rise in Chinese public diplomacy efforts in the Philippines, Filipino perceptions of China have mainly remained negative during the Duterte period. This article examines why and how China’s public diplomacy efforts have primarily failed despite President Duterte’s pro-China position. It draws on constructivist approaches to demonstrate how national identity mediates the impact of Chinese influence. In particular, Chinese incursions in the West Philippine Sea, and an influx of China-based offshore gaming businesses in the country, have elicited a strong nationalist response from Filipinos, perpetuating perceptions of China as untrustworthy and threatening. Evidence is drawn to determine correlation between an increase in Chinese public diplomacy and a decrease in public trust towards China. This is followed by process-tracing how national identity dampens any positive effect Chinese public diplomacy may have on Philippine attitudes towards China.
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| 7 |
ID:
091018
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Providing an overview of the emergence, characteristics, trajectory, and potential limitations of the transnational anti-base network, this article focuses on two broad questions relevant to transnational politics. First, what processes and mechanisms enabled local and transnational activists to form the international No Bases network? Second, how did activists juxtapose existing local anti-base identity and frames to emerging transnational ones? Following existing transnational movement theories, I argue that the global anti-base network slowly emerged through processes of diffusion and scale shift in its early stages. The onset of the Iraq War, however, injected new life into the transnational anti-base movement, eventually leading to the inaugural International Conference for the Abolition of Foreign Bases in 2007. Although loose transnational ties existed among anti-base activists prior to 2003, the U.S. war in Iraq presented anti-base activists the global frames necessary to accelerate the pace of diffusion, scale-shift, and brokerage, and hence, the consolidation of a transnational anti-base network. Paradoxically, however, even as No Bases leaders attempted to forge a new transnational identity, anti-base activists, as "rooted cosmopolitans," continued to anchor their struggle in local initiatives.
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| 8 |
ID:
071589
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2006.
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Facing massive protests, why did incumbent regimes in both South Korea and Poland repress movements for democratization in the early 1980s but make democratic concessions to the opposition in the late 1980s? This article demonstrates how the United States and the Soviet Union as superpower patron states influenced democratic transitions in South Korea and Poland. The different outcomes across time are partially attributed to superpower policies toward their client states. Absent in 1980 were strong, credible signals from the United States and the Soviet Union to their respective client states to support political liberalization. But in the late 1980a, superpowers affected the calculus of client state elites by either signaling or encouraging governments to make concessions to the opposition.
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