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| 1 |
ID:
140246
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Progressive People's Sector Publications (p) Ltd., 1976.
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| Description |
216p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 029472 | 951.058/SHA 029472 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
063849
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| 3 |
ID:
131601
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Iran provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with information about the country's past development of a detonator that could be used as a trigger in nuclear weapons, the agency said last month in a quarterly report. The report also found that Iran is complying with the measures outlined in an interim agreement it reached Nov. 24 with six world powers that restricts its nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. The "technical exchange" with the IAEA on the issues related to possible nuclear weapons development was the first since 2008, the May 23 report said.
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| 4 |
ID:
184369
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| 5 |
ID:
130191
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The second year of Kim Jong Un's rule in North Korea was enormously eventful. The year began with Pyongyang carrying out its third nuclear test, a move of reckless brinksmanship that alarmed the region and beyond. North Korea formally declared its goal of ''simultaneously pursuing nuclear and economic development,'' but failed to take a decisive step toward economic reform. The ruthless purge and execution of Jang Song-taek revealed the structural weakness of the ruling system.
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| 6 |
ID:
020799
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| Publication |
Feb 2002.
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| Description |
25-27
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| 7 |
ID:
079854
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to assess the strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear development. It calls into question the conventional wisdom that Pyongyang's atomic weapons will not only undermine the state of deterrence on the Korean peninsula, but also will trigger a nuclear domino effect throughout East Asia. A nuclear-armed North Korea, I argue, still cannot win a major victory over the South and the United States; Pyongyang's bombs somewhat decrease - rather than increase, as many believe - the risk of US preventive attack. And the regional US military presence as well as the available missile defence technology is sufficient to persuade Seoul and Tokyo not to pursue nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. While I reject the alarmist view, I find that North Korea's armament nevertheless carries two significant - albeit less grave - risks that have received little scholarly scrutiny. First, I argue that the risk of inadvertent war through pre-emption will increase with Pyongyang's armament. I also argue that the strengthening of US alliances in the region as well as the US development of a missile defence capability in response to the North Korean threat could exacerbate the security dilemmas among major powers. I conclude, however, that these potential dangers do not markedly threaten regional stability
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| 8 |
ID:
007767
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| Publication |
Fall 1995.
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| Description |
118-172
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