Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
078162
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2 |
ID:
077538
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Publication |
2007.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article surveys the history of Cyprus's conflict and partition to derive historical, tactical, and strategic lessons about how the Cyprus problem should be resolved and about the value of partitions more generally. Cyprus is complex. Tensions between North and South are very low, in part because the partition has been a cause of peace. However, both sides remain pervaded by antagonistic and one-sided biases, histories, and myths. Moreover, almost every plausible solution, including the Annan Plan, that proposes to unite the island also incorporates the group-based and gridlock-prone characteristics of the conflict-generating 1960 constitution. A Cyprus solution solves little and creates risks. A better plan to create a permanent peace is to recognize a much smaller North, and bring all sides including Turkey into the European Union. This would create peace, give most Greek Cypriot refugees their land and homes back, and restore all freedoms throughout the island
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3 |
ID:
072098
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4 |
ID:
073559
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5 |
ID:
073574
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Haagerup Report commissioned by the European Parliament in 1984 was the first major initiative taken by the European Union (EU) on the situation of conflict in Northern Ireland. It embodied a conceptualization of the conflict as between two national identities defined in relation to the Irish border. The EU's self-ascribed role towards a settlement in Northern Ireland since that time has followed this vein by supporting the peaceful expression of British and Irish identities rather than reconstructing them or creating alternatives. This nation-based approach is encapsulated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement between the governments of the UK and Ireland and political parties in Northern Ireland. Through detailed analysis of the Haagerup Report in the light of the peace process in Northern Ireland as a whole, this article assesses the implications of conceptualizing Northern Ireland as a clash of national identities for resolution of the conflict and argues for a subsequent reconsideration of the EU's role in conflict resolution.
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