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| 1 |
ID:
168483
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| Summary/Abstract |
Confusion between the idea of development as purposeful intervention and development as outcome has been addressed by efforts to distinguish ‘intentional’ from ‘immanent’ development, and the distinction between ‘big D’ development as Western post- World War Two modernisation in the Global South, and ‘little d’ as the creation of winners and losers within unfolding capitalist change. As a heuristic device this distinction has been put to a variety of uses within development studies, but it has rarely been subjected to further scrutiny. This paper asks (1) whether the distinction remains coherent or risks being stretched too far, and (2) whether it remains relevant within the changing landscape of twenty-first century development. It first traces the historical evolution of the distinction, and then presents an exploratory case study of Bangladesh’s garment sector in order to analyse the relationship between the two kinds of development empirically, identifying a number of contradictions and ambiguities. It finds that while the ‘D/d’ distinction remains useful at a general level, further conceptualisation is now needed, and its relevance may fade as the significance of Western aid declines.
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| 2 |
ID:
128625
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| 3 |
ID:
058835
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| 4 |
ID:
173909
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| Summary/Abstract |
How non-governmental organisations (NGOs) craft accountability and legitimacy in authoritarian states is poorly understood. We put forward a framework of analysis for capturing the processes of making accountability and legitimacy. We introduce the ideas of first- and second-order accountability and stocks of accountability capital. In authoritarian regimes, building second-order accountability through the accumulation of stocks of accountability is crucial for NGOs’ survival and organisational development and as a path towards gaining first-order accountability. Drawing on a decade of fieldwork on child welfare NGOs in China from 2007 to 2017, we select three case studies with long operational trajectories to illustrate processes of crafting legitimacy and accountability. The research contributes empirically and theoretically to the understanding of accountability in NGOs in authoritarian states through the novel analytic framework and case study of China.
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| 5 |
ID:
083624
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract: The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set of international development targets agreed to by members of the United Nations in 2000. The goals aim to improve many of the dimensions of extreme poverty and are to be achieved by 2015. This paper provides an overview of the issues relevant to the achievement of the MDGs in the Asia-Pacific region. The paper begins by discussing the critiques of the MDGs before assessing whether countries in the region are on track to achieve them. Issues relating to data availability and accuracy are discussed and the need to tailor the MDG targets to the special circumstances of some Asia-Pacific countries is examined. The paper proceeds by discussing the role of international assistance via international foreign development aid and non-governmental organisations in the achievement of the MDGs. The paper concludes with some policy implications for the international donor community.
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| 6 |
ID:
119191
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While existing scholarship focuses attention on the impact of state control and repression on Chinese civil society, the increasingly independent role of the Communist Party has been largely overlooked. This article reviews the Party's drive to "comprehensively cover" grassroots society over the previous decade against the theoretical debate unfolding among Chinese scholars and Party theoreticians regarding the Party's role with respect to civil society. Focusing on greater Shanghai, frequently cited as a national model of Party-building, I describe the Party's advance and the emergence of Party-organized non-governmental organizations (PONGOs), a new hybrid form of social organization sponsored and supported by local Party committees. I argue that these developments invite a reconsideration of our understandings of the ongoing "associational revolution" and of the Party's relationship to China's flourishing "third realm."
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| 7 |
ID:
129142
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| 8 |
ID:
132344
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A number of the NGOs now working in Afghanistan, like Oxfam, Afghan Aid and the Agha Khan Foundation have been there for many years and show no sign of planning to leave when NATO troops withdraw. This article is written by a committee member of the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, which was formally established in Bergen in 1980, as a political reaction to the Soviet invasion. In 1983, the Committee started sending health workers into unoccupied areas of the country and their activities have continued ever since, though the Soviets left nearly a quarter of a century ago. The goodwill and contacts built up over time by the Committee and other NGOs have been important in validating their presence, their activities and their motives. To be useful in Afghanistan needs a commitment to the long haul.
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| 9 |
ID:
061826
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| 10 |
ID:
077215
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The concept of 'mixed blood' is not a new one; however, it was not until 1982 that an unprecedented policy entitled 'The Amerasian Act' was created by the US government. Focusing on the author's ethnographic fieldwork in South Korea and the US, this article will unpack the assumptions underlying the seemingly religious statement 'the American thing to do' in terms of US policy, where ostensibly scientific notions of 'race', blood and identity are employed
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| 11 |
ID:
132006
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On a wintry January evening in 1973, the members of Amnesty International USA Group 11 gathered on the Upper East Side of New York City to adopt a new prisoner of conscience, Sutanti Adit of Indonesia. Adit, a medical doctor and the wife of the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, had been arrested and imprisoned in the ruthless campaigns of repression that followed a failed 1965 coup against the Sukarno government, which had ruled Indonesia since its formal independence from Dutch colonial control in 1950. She was among more than a hundred thousand Indonesians arrested, interrogated (often under torture), and imprisoned by the state. As many as fifty thousand of them remained in custody for more than a decade housed in prison camps whose sanitation, medical facilities, and food were inadequate at best. They were permitted very limited contact with the outside world, including family and friends, and harshly mistreated by prison guards.1
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| 12 |
ID:
119270
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Transnational human rights networks span the globe, and have become more numerous and influential since the 1970s. Yet we still know relatively little about the strategic interaction between transnational advocates and their targeted state actors. Focusing on such a strategic interaction, we argue that transnational advocacy is less a diffusion of authority away from state actors than a change in the ways in which the politics of accountability is conducted between sophisticated state and non-state actors. In particular, we show that targeted actors (e.g. impugned states) can develop their own discursive capacities to challenge the facts and interpretations offered by transnational advocates and 'turn the tables' on them, expanding the scope of accountability to include the conduct of NGOs themselves. Empirically, we examine the efforts made by Human Rights Watch (HRW) to make the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) accountable during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and the Gaza war of 2008-9.
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| 13 |
ID:
190047
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Under the headings of promoting human rights and international law, the influential network of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has been a central actor in the political war targeting Israel though allegations of apartheid and racism. In applying these slanders, the NGOs systematically erase the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including decades of warfare and terrorism, and join in the attempt to delegitimize the nation-state of the Jewish people, regardless of borders, and as distinct from criticism of Israeli policies regarding territory occupied in the 1967 war. This process constitutes the essence of post-Holocaust or ‘new antisemitism’, as included in the consensus working definition published by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. The NGO campaigns are constructed on the foundations established by the Soviet and Islamic blocs culminating in the 1975 UN ‘Zionism is racism’ resolution. This theme was revived in the NGO Forum of the 2001 Durban Conference, led by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Palestinian groups such as Al-Haq, and used to justify appropriating the methods of the South African anti-apartheid campaign, including boycotts and lawfare. After the Durban conference and for 20 years since, this NGO network continued and expanded the campaign based on the apartheid and racism allegations. Their claims were amplified in media platforms, international bodies, anti-Israel church groups and on university campuses in the form of ‘Israel apartheid weeks’. European governments enabled activities of the Palestinian and Israeli NGOs through substantial funding, estimated at 120 million Euros annually. In 2020 and 2021, the NGO emphasis on these themes increased, led by HRW, and supporting the decision of the ICC prosecutor to accept jurisdiction over Palestinian claims and to open investigations against Israel. This context amplified the potency of the allegations of apartheid and racism in attempts to demonise Israel.
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| 14 |
ID:
186592
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nongovernmental organizations are central to contemporary global governance, and their numbers and influence have grown dramatically since the middle of the twentieth century. However, in the last three decades more than 130 states have repressed these groups, suggesting that a broad range of states perceive them as costly. When they choose to repress NGOs, under what conditions do states use violent strategies versus administrative means? The choice depends on two main factors: the nature of the threat posed by these groups, and the consequences of cracking down on them. Violent crackdown is useful in the face of immediate domestic threats, such as protests. However, violence may increase the state's criminal liability, reduce its legitimacy, violate human rights treaties, and further intensify mobilization against the regime. Therefore, states are more likely to use administrative crackdown, especially in dealing with long-term threats, such as when NGOs influence electoral politics. I test this theory using an original data set of administrative crackdowns on NGOs, as well as violent crackdown on NGO activists, across all countries from 1990 to 2013. To shed light on the strategic decision between violent or administrative crackdown, and how states may perceive threats from domestic and international NGOs differently, I provide a case study from India. I conclude by discussing the implications of this crackdown for the use of civil society actors by the international community, as well as donors and citizens in the global South.
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| 15 |
ID:
083594
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Given that states have long considered elections a purely domestic matter, the dramatic growth of international election monitoring in the 1990s was remarkable. Why did states allow international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to interfere and why did international election monitoring spread so quickly? Why did election monitoring become institutionalized in so many organizations? Perhaps most puzzling, why do countries invite monitors and nevertheless cheat? This article develops a rigorous method for investigating the causal mechanisms underlying the rise of election monitoring, and "norm cascades" more generally. The evolution and spread of norms, as with many other social processes, are complex combinations of normative, instrumental, and other constraints and causes of action. The rise of election monitoring has been driven by an interaction of instrumentalism, emergent norms, and fundamental power shifts in the international system. By dissecting this larger theoretical complexity into specific subclaims that can be empirically investigated, this article examines the role of each of these causal factors, their mutual tensions, and their interactive contributions to the evolution of election monitoring
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| 16 |
ID:
183142
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent decades, civil society organizations (CSOs) have ostensibly attained increased access to the United Nations (UN) and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and, in turn, increased opportunities for collaboration with IGOs. However, in most cases, CSO access to IGOs remains limited and highly regimented. Little scholarship has been undertaken to examine barriers to effective CSO–IGO collaborations. Virtually, no empirical research has examined the degree or nature of the interaction between the UN and international civil society via the dynamic of the flagship programme designed to facilitate such collaborations—the consultative status framework. This exploratory study partially addresses the latter gap in the scholarship by undertaking a qualitative macro-scale examination of CSOs within the UN Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) consultative status programme, the primary vehicle in the UN–civil society dynamic. Specifically, the study sought to identify barriers to UN–civil society collaboration within the consultative status programme as perceived by participating CSOs. Findings of a survey sent to a random sample of 10% of CSOs holding UN–ECOSOC consultative status revealed that barriers to participation in the programme varied with some obstacles far more common than others. The degree of barriers reported by CSOs also strongly reflected the level of accreditation they held within the programme. Additionally, survey respondents offered insight as to how impediments in the collaboration could potentially be addressed.
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| 17 |
ID:
017544
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Summer 2000.
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| Description |
1-22
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| 18 |
ID:
095832
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article identifies four types of issue entrepreneurs in the creation of public issues about the environment and health in China. They are media professionals, environmental and health NGOs, villagers, and netizens. Because of the different resources of issue entrepreneurs and the constraints of China's political context, politically safe and innocuous issues and issues of concern to the urban population are more likely to enter the public sphere. Contentious issues linked to the interests of powerful business and political actors may become publicized under extraordinary circumstances such as emergencies, disasters, or epidemics, suggesting that external shocks may have a galvanizing effect. Some environment-related health issues, such as pollution-related cancer, are high-stake issues. They often affect the most disadvantaged segments of the Chinese population, yet despite their gravity, their chances of entering the public sphere are small.
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| 19 |
ID:
126516
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The conventional wisdom in the literature on aid allocation suggests that donors utilize bilateral aid as a tool to buy influence in the aid-receiving country. Those who conclude that aid is driven by donor self-interest focus on government-to-government aid transfers. However, this approach overlooks important variation in delivery tactics: Bilateral donors frequently provide aid to nonstate actors. This paper argues that donors resort to delivery tactics that increase the likelihood of aid achieving its intended outcome. In poorly governed recipient countries, donors bypass recipient governments and deliver more aid through nonstate actors, all else equal. In recipient countries with higher governance quality, donors engage the government and give more aid through the government-to-government channel. Using OLS and Probit regressions, I find empirical support for this argument. Understanding the determinants of donor delivery tactics has important implications for assessing aid effectiveness.
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| 20 |
ID:
123017
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Do international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) lessen the need for states to provide their own services? In the case of health, many assume that INGOs limit health spending by governments. Against the conventional wisdom, we argue that these organizations create increased demand for governmental health spending through three mechanisms: (1) indirectly affecting the policy-making climate ("climatic conditioning"), (2) aiding domestic NGO and health activists in their efforts, and (3) directly pressuring governments for increased health spending themselves. Given these mechanisms, health INGOs, although typically supplying health services of their own within a country, should augment pressure for public service provision by the state and, it follows, lead to increased state health spending. We test our argument using a new data set on health INGOs, together with a well-established model of health spending, and find ample support for our arguments. Increases in health INGOs' activities do lead to increased governmental health spending, mainly by indirectly affecting the policy-making climate and, most especially, advancing the effective efforts of domestic activists.
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