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ID:
121126
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article documents that precolonial state development was an impediment to the development of democracy outside Europe, because indigenous state institutions constrained the European colonial endeavor and limited the diffusion of European institutions and ideas. Some countries were strong enough to resist colonization; others had enough state infrastructure that the colonizers would rule through existing institutions. Neither group therefore experienced institutional transplantation or European settlement. Less developed states, in contrast, were easier to colonize and were often colonized with institutional transplantation and an influx of settlers carrying ideals of parliamentarism. Using OLS and IV estimation, I present statistical evidence of an autocratic legacy of early statehood and document the proposed causal channel for a large sample of non-European countries. The conclusion is robust to different samples, different democracy indices, an array of exogenous controls, and several alternative theories of the causes and correlates of democracy.
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2 |
ID:
123092
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
JAE HYEOK SHIN analyzes cabinet duration in ten presidential democracies in Latin America. He ?nds that cabinet attributes greatly affect cabinet durability and that the performance of the cabinet has larger effects on its stability than do its handling of exogenous crises.
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3 |
ID:
032780
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Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.
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Description |
xii, 344p.hbk
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Series |
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
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Standard Number |
0521343305
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
030667 | 948.505/LEW 030667 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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4 |
ID:
120167
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Publication |
New Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2003.
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Description |
xxxvi,459p.hbk
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Standard Number |
812200654X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
057242 | 328.54/MEH 057242 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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5 |
ID:
072147
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6 |
ID:
107320
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
Semi-presidentialism is a vague term which may refer to several different forms of government. This paper explores only one special type of semi-presidentialism, and shows that, even under similar institutional arrangements, actual practices may differ greatly. The two cases, France and Taiwan, share the basic features of such a system, though the French president has more powers than his counterpart in Taiwan. But interestingly, when the presidents party/coalition has been in the minority in parliament, the French president has frequently chosen to compromise and to cohabit ate with a prime minister supported by the parliamentary majority, while his counterpart in Taiwan has decided to confront the parliament by forming a minority government. As argued in the paper this can be accounted for by strategic behavior on the part of the president and the parliamentary majority in manipulating the loophole created by such a system. History and the nature of social cleavages have something to do with it as well.
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7 |
ID:
127640
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The authors analyze the far from simple development of Kyrgyz parliamentarism, the republic's experience of building the parliament (the Jogorku Kenesh) and its objective problems and shortcomings. The article is based on the personal experience of one of the authors who served as a deputy and speaker of one of the convocations and on the authors' scrutiny of the processes related to the parliament's activities.
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