| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
083201
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The effectiveness of nuclear weapons in deterring war lies not just in their
ability to cause destruction but in the certainty that it cannot be avoided if
they are used. Conventional warfare is also so horrific that opponents of
deterrence have never convinced society that retaining nuclear weapons
is a greater evil than running the risks of renouncing them. As conflicts
erupt without warning, the end of the Cold War does not justify unilateralism.
A strategic nuclear deterrent, like conventional Armed Forces in peacetime,
is an essential insurance policy against unpredictable dangers. A
successor to Trident will not breach the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it is
right to apply different standards to dictatorships and democracies where
nuclear weapons are concerned. Most of the current arguments about the
British deterrent, including its degree of independence from the United
States, were debated in depth in the early 1960s when the V-Bombers were
scheduled for replacement by Polaris. The Chiefs of Staff, under Lord
Mountbatten, were adamant that the safety of the country and its freedom
of action would be seriously undermined without an independently
controlled strategic deterrent. This view remains sound, irrespective of the
demise of the Soviet Union.
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| 2 |
ID:
081444
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| 3 |
ID:
145936
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| Summary/Abstract |
The immediate cause of the First World War was the Kaiser’s violation of Belgian neutrality, as part of a planned assault against France. The direct cause of the Second World War was Hitler’s invasion of Poland, after a secret agreement with Stalin to carve up its territory. In both cases, German aggression was not deterred by the prospect of conflict with European states individually or in combination. In both cases, too, the late entry of the US as a belligerent made a decisive difference to the outcome.
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| 4 |
ID:
072171
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| 5 |
ID:
131129
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In response to Malcolm Chalmers' article in the December 2013 edition of the RUSI Journal, Julian Lewis MP argues that abandoning continuous at-sea deterrence is a step too far down the 'nuclear ladder'.
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| 6 |
ID:
086844
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The current economic crisis and two costly wars have put much strain on British defence planners. Government expenditure is being placed under increasing scrutiny. There have been voices claiming that Trident is an unnecessary expense. This article counters this argument and advocates the necessity of maintaining and renewing Britain's nuclear deterrent.
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| 7 |
ID:
154015
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