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| 1 |
ID:
173175
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, we reflect on critical questions relating to the future of African migration to China in the post-COVID-19 world at the backdrop of the mistreatment many Africans received as part of the pandemic control in China. These questions include: Is this the end of African migration to China as we know it? Will COVID-19 fundamentally change how we think about migration, mobility and wellbeing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? What will be the effect of the post-COVID-19 regime on the social identity and wellbeing of the African diaspora in Guangzhou and other Chinese cities?
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| 2 |
ID:
139649
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| 3 |
ID:
090078
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| Publication |
Canberra, Air Power Development Centre, 2009.
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| Description |
xxii, 84p.
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| Standard Number |
9781920800444
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054365 | 358.4134320994/HAL 054365 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
150139
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| 5 |
ID:
193490
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides an ethnographic account of automated surveillance technologies' impact in the occupied West Bank, taking Blue Wolf—a biometric identification system deployed by the Israeli army—as a case study. Interviews with Palestinian residents of Hebron subjected to intensive surveillance, a senior Israeli general turned biometric start-up founder, and testimonies from veterans tasked with building up Blue Wolf's database provide a rare view into the uneven texture of life under algorithmic surveillance. Their narratives reveal how automated surveillance systems function as a form of state-sponsored terror. As a globalized information economy intersects with the eliminatory aims of Israeli settler colonialism in Hebron, new surveillance technologies erode Palestinian social life while allowing technocratic settlers to recast the violence of occupation as an opportunity for capital investment and growth. Attending to the texture of life under algorithmic surveillance in Hebron ultimately reorients theories of accumulation and dispossession in the digital age away from purely economistic framings. Instead, I foreground the violent political imperatives that drive innovations in surveillance, in Palestine and worldwide.
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| 6 |
ID:
173365
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| Summary/Abstract |
For well over twenty years, we have witnessed an intriguing debate about the nature of cyberspace. Used for everything from communication to commerce, it has transformed the way individuals and societies live. But how has it impacted the sovereignty of states? An initial wave of scholars argued that it had dramatically diminished centralised control by states, helped by a tidal wave of globalisation and freedom. These libertarian claims were considerable. More recently, a new wave of writing has argued that states have begun to recover control in cyberspace, focusing on either the police work of authoritarian regimes or the revelations of Edward Snowden. Both claims were wide of the mark. By contrast, this article argues that we have often misunderstood the materiality of cyberspace and its consequences for control. It not only challenges the libertarian narrative of freedom, it suggests that the anarchic imaginary of the Internet as a ‘Wild West’ was deliberately promoted by states in order to distract from the reality. The Internet, like previous forms of electronic connectivity, consists mostly of a physical infrastructure located in specific geographies and jurisdictions. Rather than circumscribing sovereignty, it has offered centralised authority new ways of conducting statecraft. Indeed, the Internet, high-speed computing, and voice recognition were all the result of security research by a single information hegemon and therefore it has always been in control.
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| 7 |
ID:
132561
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This Viewpoint addresses American space strategy and the choices that lie before US space practitioners. Space activities today play critical roles in U.S. national security, economic growth, and scientific achievements. Satellite communications link the world. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is an integral part of several critical infrastructures, and enables functions ranging from survey and construction, to farming, finance, and air traffic management e not to mention US military forces worldwide. Less well understood is how the GPS time signal provides a global time base for encrypted communications e including point-of-sale transactions with credit or debit cards. Without GPS, much of today's economy would come to a halt. Beyond the Earth, we have rovers on the surface of Mars, and a probe that has left the solar system. The International Space Station represents a unique collaborative
partnership between the United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, and Russia. Spacefaring states are concerned with the long-term sustainability and security of space activities as a result of increasing orbital debris and the proliferation of space capabilities of new national entrants, some of them potential adversaries.
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| 8 |
ID:
178184
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In the early 1980s, the East German Ministry for State Security systematically recruited Arab students as covert informers. Analysis of this historical case contributes to discussions about surveillance as a social practice and to an emerging critical literature about intelligence agencies as knowledge producers and agents of governance. Proceeding from a close reading of archives documenting the recruitment process, I argue that it produced, first, classic modern bureaucratic security mechanisms designed to govern populations and, second, highly specific sovereign interventions into the lives of single individuals. By focusing primarily on the agents of surveillance, rather than its objects, the article addresses an important gap in the surveillance literature.
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| 9 |
ID:
127712
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although intelligence postmortems are a common practice in the aftermath of intelligence failure, little is known about how they are conducted. This article explores the methodology employed by Robert Jervis in intelligence postmortems that followed the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the formulation of the 2002 Iraq national intelligence estimate that warned of the possibility that Iraq had restarted its nuclear program. The analysis reveals the challenges faced by scholars as they attempt to assess why analysts failed to offer accurate estimates and the way contemporary international relations theory can be applied to the realm of policy. The findings of the postmortems also shed light on areas where additional collaboration among scholars and analysts can advance the art of intelligence analysis.
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| 10 |
ID:
157068
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| Summary/Abstract |
Critical analyses of security have focused on the production of knowledge, techniques, and devices that tame unknowns and render social problems actionable. Drawing on insights from, science and technology studies and the emerging interdisciplinary field of “ignorance studies,” this article proposes to explore the enactment of non-knowledge in security and legal practices. Starting with legal challenges brought against the NSA and other intelligence agencies after the Snowden revelations about mass surveillance, it shows how different modes of non-knowledge are enacted and not just “tamed”: uncertainty, ignorance, secrecy, ambiguity, and error. The enactment of non-knowledge has important implications for how we understand security practices, the relation between security and law, and public challenges to mass surveillance in a digital world. On the one hand, the enactment of non-knowledge by security and legal professionals limits activist and NGO resistance to mass surveillance, when these are focused on claims to knowledge, disclosure, and transparency. On the other, reassembling non-knowledge and knowledge differently has generative political effects and opens new possibilities for intervention and resistance.
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| 11 |
ID:
168495
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This article examines Turkey’s authoritarian state surveillance regime by developing the concept of the authoritarian surveillant assemblage (ASA), building on and expanding the concept of the surveillant assemblage (SA). Turkey’s ASA is the outcome of diverse surveillance systems, which continuously expand their reach, form new connections and incorporate new actors. These systems include a protest and dissent surveillance system, an internet surveillance system, a synoptic media surveillance system and an informant–collaborator surveillance system. Turkey’s ASA is controlled by the Turkish state and serves its repressive interests. Although pivotal in emphasizing the complexity of surveillance connections and increasing diversification of and collaboration among surveillance actors, the SA model of surveillance puts the main emphasis on decentralized, uncoordinated and multifaceted forms of surveillance, and does not offer sufficient analytical space to understand how an authoritarian state could coordinate diverse surveillance systems and use it for the overarching purpose of control. The article draws on Michael Mann’s theory of state power and the authoritarian state to address these limitations of the SA and conceptualize the ASA. It shows how the diverse systems of Turkey’s ASA work in concert with one another under the hierarchical command of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) to control the population and suppress dissent.
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| 12 |
ID:
140092
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| 13 |
ID:
075667
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the impact of the anti-Bolshevik surveillance network created by the colonial state on the urban political milieu of Calcutta during the late 1910s and the early 1920s. The first socialists in Calcutta (1921-24), predominantly Muslims, emerged from the ranks of urban intellectuals and political activists. The article argues that the state's insistence on labelling various social and political segments, including early socialists, as political tools of Moscow demonstrated its inability to grasp the local responses to an international current. It is shown that despite enforcement of various strategies, which tried to anticipate and prevent the spread of socialism, the colonial state failed to counter the emergence of the left in the city.
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| 14 |
ID:
131904
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| 15 |
ID:
159871
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Identity cards and surveillance practices form an important part of migrant experience and politics. Drawing on fieldwork in construction sites and factory premises in Ernakulam district and a market frequented by migrants in Perumbavoor, a small city near Kochi in Kerala, this paper argues that ID-based surveillance of migrant workers occurs through a complex spatial web of state repression, local power structures and fissures within the classes of workers in Kerala. Migrant workers from North and Northeastern India, and unionized Malayali workers in construction sites and factories in Kerala, battle for and against these cards. Migrant workers resist not necessarily class power that inheres in capital, but the state and surveillance practices.
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| 16 |
ID:
150490
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| Summary/Abstract |
The “Snowden leaks” and censorship methods used during the Arab Spring have brought warranted attention to technologically supported censorship and surveillance (Bauman et al. 2014; Deibert and Crete-Nishihata 2012, 344). The public is now aware how digital tools and information are prone to tracing, interception, and suppression. Processes of eavesdropping and information collection (i.e., surveillance) are often interrelated with processes of removal, displacement, and restriction of material or speech (i.e., censorship). Both are often enshrouded in secrecy, leaving censorship and surveillance techniques open to abuses (Setty 2015).
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| 17 |
ID:
144199
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Internet's original design provided a modicum of privacy for users; it was not always possible to determine where a device was or who was using it. But a combination of changes, including “free” Internet services, increasing use of mobile devices to access the network, and the coming “Internet of Things” (sensors everywhere) make surveillance much easier to achieve and privacy more difficult to protect. Yet there are also technologies that enable communications privacy, including address anonymizers and encryption. Use of such technologies complicate law-enforcement and national-security communications surveillance, but do not completely block it. Privacy versus surveillance in Internet communications can be viewed as a complex set of economic tradeoffs–for example, obtaining free services in exchange for a loss of privacy; and protecting communications in exchange for a more expensive, and thus less frequently used, set of government investigative techniques–and choices abound.
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| 18 |
ID:
094638
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| 19 |
ID:
133611
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The pressing issues around cyberspace revolve around internet governance, cybersecurity and drawing up rules of the road for the new domain of cyberwar. While each of these is at a different stage in its evolution cycle, cyberspace itself is facing a watershed moment as insecurities mount. The fragmentation of cyberspace seems inevitable unless there is accelerated movement on resolving the fundamental issues of internet governance and cybersecurity that have been hanging fire for well over a decade.
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| 20 |
ID:
159786
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| Summary/Abstract |
The recent proliferation of the securitization of crowded places has led to a growth in the development of technologies of crowd behaviour analysis. However, despite the emerging prominence of crowd surveillance in emergency planning, its impacts on our understanding of security and surveillance have received little discussion. Using the case of crowd surveillance in Tokyo, this article examines the ways in which crowds are simulated, monitored and secured through the technology of crowd behaviour analysis, and discusses the implications on the politics of security. It argues that crowd surveillance constitutes a unique form of the biopolitics of security that targets not the individual body or the social body of population, but the urban body of crowd. The power of normalization in crowd surveillance operates in a preemptive manner through the codification of crowd behaviour that is spatially and temporarily specific. The article also interrogates the introduction of crowd surveillance in relation to racialized logics of suspicion and argues that, despite its appearance as non-discriminatory and ‘a-racial’, crowd surveillance entails the racial coding of crowd behaviour and urban space. The article concludes with the introduction of crowd surveillance as a border control technology, which reorients existing modalities of (in)securitization at airports.
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