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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
140334
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| Summary/Abstract |
Forty billion dollars of ODA over the past two decades has reduced destitution in post-socialist and post-conflict Ethiopia. It has also boosted the technocratic capacity of exclusionary state institutions, while doubly enfeebling the fledgling private sector and independent political and civic organisations. This aid–institution paradox is a product of an alignment of donor–recipient strategic interests. The five major donors pursued geopolitical and poverty reduction objectives; and the narrowly based ruling elite sought total capture of the state, ownership of the development agenda and use of pro-poor growth to leverage large aid inflows and to seek domestic political legitimacy. By coupling poverty reduction with adequate space for inclusive market, civic and political engagement, a farsighted coalition of donors could have complemented capacity building with the promotion of state resilience. Scaled-up aid can still be delivered, as in Eastern Europe, conditional on meaningful mutual accountability and the rule of law.
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| 2 |
ID:
072622
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After the collapse of the two communist multinational states, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the fact that China survives as the only communist multinational state poses an interesting question: why does China remain intact and how long will it be able to survive in its present state? This paper tries to address these questions. The analysis is centred on three areas: the formation and characteristics of China's ethnic minorities and their role in this multinational state; the relevant domestic politics including institution building and polices; and the influence of external conditions such as international law and realpolitik. The preliminary finding is that in fact only two minority groups in two regions, Tibetans in Tibet and Uygurs in Xinjiang, have the real potential of secession, but it is very unlikely that China as a multinational state will disintegrate in the near future because the internal environment and international politics do not constitute adequate conditions for that to happen.
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| 3 |
ID:
085672
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
States' conscription policies reveal much about their security climate, economic constraints, political debates, and social norms. While conscription has waned among democratic countries, several states maintain it as a way to socialize and educate their citizens. As post-communist states embrace Western influence and NATO, many have ended compulsory military service. In post-Soviet Georgia, however, conscription policy is a microcosm illustrating the difficulties of bridging security vulnerabilities, political upheaval, and resource realities. Although previous scholarship predicts that security and economic needs should supersede other considerations, we find that the domestic political context looms larger for decision makers of transitioning states
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| 4 |
ID:
187975
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| Summary/Abstract |
China has been a proponent of global governance reform, but its reform strategy does not remain constant. In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, its political opportunities were depleting when dominant states, especially the United States, were recovering from the crisis. As a result, the promised 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform package failed to materialize under Beijing’s old reform strategy of making overt proposals. We argue that Beijing’s goal of the IMF reform was achieved through the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. To advance reform, the newly-created institution needs to have sufficient governance capacity to ensure its effectiveness, produce policy outcomes close to Beijing’s preferences, and operate in an issue area competing for resources with the established institution, the IMF, but not necessarily in the same issue area as is required by the literature of contested multilateralism.
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