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| 1 |
ID:
075386
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As tensions across the Taiwan Strait have risen in recent years, some have argued that the US policy of strategic ambiguity-under which Washington leaves unclear if and how it would intervene in a cross-Strait conflict-has outlived its usefulness because ambiguity may foster dangerous misperceptions about US intentions and hence contribute to future crises. In this essay I critically examine strategic ambiguity, and conclude that ambiguity remains the best policy available to Washington given current US goals in the Taiwan Strait. I argue that ambiguity remains essential both to deterring a Chinese attack and to restraining Taiwanese moves toward independence, but that it nonetheless carries with it inherent risks of conflict. I further argue, however, that these additional risks triggered by ambiguity per se are likely small, and hence are overshadowed by the strategic obstacles faced by the alternatives to an ambiguous policy. Moreover, I show that growing economic interdependence between Mainland China and Taiwan further reduces the risk that ambiguity itself would be a contributing factor to war in the Taiwan Strait. As such, the relative attractiveness of ambiguity has likely increased, rather than decreased as argued by its critics, over the past decade.
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| 2 |
ID:
146445
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the annals of the communist world, the month of October enjoys supreme sanctity. The Red October of 1917 ushered in the first socialist government, which would eventually become the Soviet Union. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), October is indelibly enshrined as the anniversary month of the founding of the communist state, observed with a multiday national celebration. But each year, amid glorious celebratory glow marking the inauguration of the PRC, the memory of a forbidden and inglorious episode surfaces—inevitably, albeit surreptitiously and furtively—within China’s educated and political elite. The event took place a little over three weeks after Mao Zedong triumphantly announced at Tiananmen Square, on 1 October 1949, the establishment of the People’s Republic.
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| 3 |
ID:
110172
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| 4 |
ID:
092637
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| 5 |
ID:
179178
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| Summary/Abstract |
For decades, one key dimension of US policy toward Taiwan has been “strategic ambiguity.”1 With its equivocal reassurance in defending Taiwan, while recognizing there is “one China,” Washington has sought both to prevent Beijing from launching an unprovoked attack on the island and to dissuade Taipei from declaring the island’s de jure independence from the mainland. Since Washington established diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1979, this policy has allowed the United States to maintain cooperative and beneficial relationships with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, contributing to peace and prosperity in the region.
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| 6 |
ID:
177080
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| Summary/Abstract |
The objectives of this paper are to elucidate Taiwan’s successful COVID-19 measures as well as the conditions surrounding the deterioration of Cross-Strait relations and to identify future prospects. The author has demonstrated the success of Taiwan’s Novel Coronavirus countermeasures and shown that China’s increasingly hardline policies toward the rest of the world and Taiwan in particular have contributed to unstable Cross-Strait relations. First, Taiwan’s successful anti-epidemic policies have done much to boost Taiwanese self-esteem. Second, within Taiwan, the majority view identified China as the source of the trouble, not the DPP. Third, with US–China relations deteriorating even further as a result of the Novel Coronavirus pandemic, the US began to actively “showcase” Taiwan’s success. Fourth, China’s Taiwan policy is expected to remain deadlocked for the time being. US–China relations are increasingly worsening, Taiwanese public opinion is trending toward increasing distance from China, and all that remains of China’s Taiwan policy is “placing hope on the mainland itself.” Thus, the Cross-Strait relationship is expected to continue deteriorating well into the future.
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| 7 |
ID:
073539
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While the six-party talks about the North Korean nuclear programme seem to have come to a standstill, Sandip Kumar Mishra points out the relations between the two Koreas have significantly improved while South Korea has grown closer to China and to Japan, despite periodic frictions. The "peaceful rise" of China as the dominant power is causing alarm in Tokyo and Washington, prompting Japan to build up its military might. Taiwan on the other hand, seems to grow ever more dependent on China.
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| 8 |
ID:
147372
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China has long upheld a neutral, if not opposing, stance to Korean unification, a stance which could be largely defined as the political risks associated with the Republic of Korea (ROK)-US alliance and the stationing of US forces (USFK) in South Korea. Given South Korea’s need to engage USFK forces, does it imply there would not be a complete resolution to the Korean conundrum and to the future status of the US-ROK alliance and the USFK forces? In the recent years, the Chinese has somewhat softened its stance and its support of South Korea’s unification initiatives can be seen coming from the party, the military, and the political realm. Empirical evidence and logical inference from recent Chinese intellectual discourse have indicated that China’s security concerns could possibly be allayed if there is a redefinition of the ROK-US alliance and the USFK in the context of defending Taiwan and if the Korean unification precedes China’s.
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| 9 |
ID:
117672
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| 10 |
ID:
072887
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The product of a ten-year debate, China's Anti-Secession Law assures Taiwan and the world that peaceful independence is a myth. The law explains that China is building military superiority to prevent Taiwan's de jure independence. This threat is matched by peace inducements, mainly economic integration, to increase the cost of independence. The ASL channels hard and soft approaches into one legal framework. Yet to this author, the ASL is fundamentally not a piece of law but a statement of Hu Jintao's new thinking. It enriches China's Taiwan policy of maintaining peace through the threat of war, the final line of defence against de jure Taiwanese independence. This article explains how the status quo is used against independence and how deliberate ambiguity has enlarged Beijing's space of manoeuvring with both Taipei and Washington. Beijing does not want war, but it must insist on its likelihood. The absence of a reunification timetable in the ASL shows that Beijing is not in a hurry to resolve the Taiwan issue. Beijing also has encouraged Washington to play a more active role in coordinating the cross-Strait interaction. The likelihood of war can best be reduced by building ambiguity into the cross-Strait relationship to avoid pressure for drastic action.
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| 11 |
ID:
154367
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China is the largest country in the region in terms of economic strength, military and land area, Since 2013, China has begun trying to alter the status quo in its neighbourhood, views the new US administrations policies as intended to retard its ambitions. While China's responses have been measured and deliberate, it has made clear it will not yield sovereignty over the South China sea. China has built airstrips and more recently, missile emplacements on the islands in the South China Sea, moved missiles to Hainan and in late February 2017, announced that it is constructing environment monitoring stations on the Scarborough Reef.
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| 12 |
ID:
147008
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Alpha Editions, 2016.
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| Description |
xii, 64p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9789386019066
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058775 | 355.0335051/WOR 058775 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
170189
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article takes as its object of analysis the term ‘little freshness’ (xiao qingxin 小清新), which has been coined to describe a variety of cultural products and phenomena, mostly emanating from Taiwan but circulating across the Taiwan Strait. It argues that little freshness is a manifestation of subcultures that have been initiated, appropriated, and consumed by youths in the region. This citizen-to-citizen connectivity reworks Joseph Nye’s notion of soft power by shifting the focus away from state agents and by reversing the direction of soft power flows to claim agency at the sites of reception. The article provides two case studies to demonstrate how an imaginary about Taiwan’s cleanness, clearness, and freshness has been projected by the media in the People’s Republic of China as a form of discursive construction and by Hong Kong citizens of Taiwan as a desirable destination for emigration. Finally, the article situates the little freshness phenomenon in relation to a propensity towards miniaturization in cultural formation in the region, and suggests that this propensity is inflected in a structure of feeling about generational injustice in the face of neoliberal capitalism.
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| 14 |
ID:
127776
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making.
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| 15 |
ID:
118584
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the Kuomintang coming to power in Taiwan, relations between the island and the mainland entered a new phase distinguished by a qualitative intensification of economic integration, expanded contacts, and substantial improvement in the overall political atmosphere. Recognition of the Consensus of 1992 by both sides served as the foundation for further progress. The idea of concluding a peace treaty is under discussion, but the ambivalent attitude toward such an agreement among the Taiwanese (and possibly the PRC leadership) is a major stumbling block. The United States is not interested in Taiwan's independence movement, although it has no objection to selling Taipei military hardware. On the whole, the peaceful development of relations between the shores of the Taiwan Strait is distinguished by considerable stability.
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| 16 |
ID:
149256
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| 17 |
ID:
077671
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Most of the contemporary policy debate regarding economic interdependence and peace has focused on devising responses either in favor of or in opposition to the prevailing notion that trade is positively and unconditionally correlated with peace. The China and Taiwan case-noteworthy for the simultaneous presence of an ever-increasing economic interdependence and an adversarial political relationship-provides an interesting counter-example to the leading positions in the literature. What is missing in the literature is a model that studies states' decisions to trade and initiate conflict as a function not only of their own utility but also of their perceptions about how their opponent will respond. States' decisions to trade depend on the likelihood that their prospective trade partner will initiate a conflict, and decisions to initiate a conflict depend on perceptions of the likelihood that the target will concede. In this article, the authors develop a model that expands the domain of the trade-peace analysis by endogenizing and analyzing states' decisions to trade and initiate conflicts
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| 18 |
ID:
128714
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| 19 |
ID:
097027
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author uses content analysis to examine the European Union's (EU's) policy on relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait from 1996 to 2009. During this period, the EU devoted increasing amounts of attention to this flashpoint in East Asia. For geographical reasons, theEU has fewer strategic interests in this region than the United States. Therefore trade and economic interests are high on the EU agenda. Nonetheless,these interests can only be secured if there is peace and stability between the two sides of the Strait. The entry of new member states into the EU since 2004 may have influenced its policy on cross-Strait relations. The firm adherence to democratic values among EU member states is the main reason behind the incessant friction between these states and China. This culminated in the abrupt canceling of the eleventh Sino-EU summit meeting by Beijing in protest at the Dalai Lama's tour of Europe in 2008.Thanks to the change of government in Taipei in May that year, a new era of reconciliation with Beijing has begun. This gives China a free hand to tackle other issues of interest. Also, China has sufferedmuch less from the recent global financial crisis than either the United States or Europe. Yet there is too much at stake for both China and the EU for them to be at odds with each other in the long run.
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| 20 |
ID:
079131
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| Publication |
2007.
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Regionalism and interregionalism have become tools for diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. Successful European integration has heightened the European Union's (EU) desire to become a more effective global actor in international security. The Taiwan Strait is one of the most dangerous flash-points which might trigger a war in Asia. Escalation of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait would undeniably have severe economic, political, and perhaps even military implications for the EU. In the light of the EU's emerging regionalism with East Asia and its efforts to achieve a discernible political and security role in the region, there is an increasing awareness in the EU of the need for it to develop its own security perspective on China and to form its own approach toward the contentious cross-Strait issue
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