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| 1 |
ID:
096198
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that mediation and political engagement by third parties can contribute to peacebuilding by strengthening the political processes in countries exiting civil conflict. Third-party engagement can create the political space within which long-term reconstruction, development, and reconciliation issues can be discussed among national actors. Given that peace agreements are frequently mere cease-fires representing short-term deals among elites, mediation and political engagement can assist the transformation of these deals into long-term commitments and inclusive national politics. Specifically, mediation can contribute to peacebuilding in three ways. First, mediators contribute to peacebuilding by working toward peace agreements that serve as frameworks for the opening up of the political process as opposed to agreements that lock in detailed, long-term governance models and concentrate power in the hands of the wartime elites. Second, in the period immediately following the signing of peace agreements, mediation helps parties adhere to the agreements and settle any remaining issues. Third, mediation contributes to making transitional governments workable and, as much as possible, ensures that they gradually lead to more inclusive political processes.
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| 2 |
ID:
072894
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article places the Iraqi National Conference of August 2004 in a comparative context by examining the role of national conferences in transitional and post-conflict countries. It argues that national conferences do not contribute significantly to a transitional process, if a prior political agreement on the process and on the role of the Conference among key stakeholders is absent. In Iraq, the disagreement over the transitional framework created by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council impeded a truly inclusive Conference from taking place. A core of established political parties, distrusted by the opposition, controlled the Conference preparations. A transparent preparatory process did not take place; the Conference did not serve as a forum for genuine dialogue. Finally, the National Council elected by the Conference did not expand political participation to credible opposition figures.
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| 3 |
ID:
078492
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Iraq's transitional politics from June 2003 to the Constitutional Referendum of October 2005. It argues that the top-down political transition led by the United States and a narrow group of Iraqi elites was inappropriate for the task of reforming the Iraqi state and building democratic institutions. The article argues that, in countries going through regime change while also radically reforming the state, inclusive transitional institutions and consultative processes contribute to agreements being reached about the future of the state. Such transitions allow actors to guarantee the continued participation of opponents in the political process and to gradually develop agreements on constitutional questions. This did not occur in Iraq. An inclusive political process and a national debate on the country's future did not occur. Rather, a narrow group of political elites led the transitional process in the absence of wide consultations. The article argues that the management of Iraq's transition had an independent impact on the outcome of the transition, namely the failure to reach agreement on the sharing of political and economic power within one state by October 2005
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