Srl | Item |
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ID:
181160
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Summary/Abstract |
Can foreign aid trigger ethnic war? The quantitative conflict literature has produced mixed findings on the effect of foreign aid on civil war in developing states. One reason for the mixed results is that a subset of civil wars, ethnic wars, are more likely than other kinds of civil wars to be triggered by foreign aid. This is because large amounts of foreign aid can cause the state to become a prize worth fighting over, mobilizing ethnic identity and group-related rebellion. This article investigates this question by testing the separate impacts of total, bilateral, and multilateral aid given by state and nonstate actors on the onset of ethnic war, using a cross-national time-series dataset of 147 countries from 1961 to 2008. The findings show a very strong association of foreign aid with ethnic war, whether measured as total aid, bilateral aid, or multilateral aid.
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2 |
ID:
072906
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
The institutionalisation of a market-oriented economy under the rule of law can be an effective factor for the stability and consolidation of democracy. Turkey has had a weak market economy with weak rule of law, caused in part by an unplanned and irrational state allocation of rents. Just as the European Union promoted democratic consolidation and the rule of law in the Spain, Portugal and Greece, it can accelerate the transformation of Turkey's economy and facilitate the consolidation of Turkey's democratic institutions. The postponement or interruption of Turkey's accession process risks increasing political instability in Turkey and the region. Integration is in the interests of both the EU and Turkey.
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