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ID: 107158

Bombs, ballots, and Coercion: the Madrid bombings, electoral politics, and terrorist strategy / Dannenbaum, Tom

Dannenbaum, Tom	Journal Article
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2011.

Summary/Abstract

In 2004, an al Qaeda affiliate killed 191 civilians in Madrid. Spain's general election three days later confounded pollsters' expectations; the incumbent Partido Popular was ousted by the challenging Partido Socialista Obrero Español ( psoe ), a party committed to withdrawal from Iraq. This manuscript examines the notion that this was a strategic terrorist success. The first strategic form considered is coercive bargaining. The paper finds that al Qaeda is not a credible coercive agent and debunks the popular myth that Spanish voters entered a coercive bargain with the network. The paper also considers the attacks through the strategic frameworks of terrorist advertising, provocation, regime destabilization, and morale building. It finds that the attacks' only strategic achievement was building morale. Finally, the paper provides a multi-factor explanation of how the Madrid bombings contributed to the psoe victory despite their lack of strategic impact. The upshot of the analysis is that there is little reason to believe such electoral impact is replicable.

Key Words

Bombs ; Spain ; Al Qaeda ; Coercion ; Terrorist Strategy ; Electoral Politics ;
Madrid Bombings ; Madrid ; Ballots

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ID: 072983

Tactical means, strategic ends: Al Qaeda's use of denial and deception / Jessee, Devin D

Jessee, Devin D	Journal Article
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Publication

2006.

Summary/Abstract

This analysis surveys Al Qaeda's employment of denial and deception (D&D) and shows that it uses D&D on tactical and operational levels in order to achieve strategic results. It defines denial and deception and explains how they relate to Al Qaeda, overviews Al Qaeda's changing network structure and seeks to summarize how Al Qaeda employs D&D throughout its operations. This paper is structured to show that denial and deception are institutionalized factors that manifest themselves through all aspects of bin Laden's organization and that the traditional conception of D&D-that nonstate actors are incapable of employing deception as an element of grand strategy-is incorrect.

Key Words

Terrorism ; Deception ; Counter-Terrorism ; Al Qaeda ; Denial ; Terrorist Strategy

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