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NYBLADE, BENJAMIN
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
073369
Electoral incentives in mixed-member systems: party, posts, and Zombie politicians in Japan
/ Pekkanen, Robert; Nyblade, Benjamin; Krauss, Ellis S
Pekkanen, Robert
Journal Article
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Publication
2006.
Summary/Abstract
How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a "best loser" or "zombie" provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.
Key Words
Political System
;
Japan
;
Electoral System
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2
ID:
136616
Playing with fire: pre-electoral fiscal manipulation and the risk of a speculative attack
/ Nyblade, Benjamin; O'Mahony, Angela
O'Mahony, Angela
Article
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Summary/Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that voters in developing countries fail to punish pervasive pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. However, we argue that governments are unlikely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when facing a high risk of speculative currency attacks. In particular, under fixed exchange rates, governments are less likely to engage in fiscal electioneering when either their real exchange rate is highly appreciated or their foreign exchange reserves are low. In contrast, under a flexible exchange rate, neither a country's real exchange rate nor its reserves affects governments' decision to engage in fiscal manipulation. Our argument receives support through a quantitative analysis of government budget balances in 97 developing countries from 1975 to 2005.
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