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ID:
106602
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The authors' previous research has established that the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War resulted from a deliberate Soviet plan to provoke Israel into a pre-emptive strike, which would legitimize and trigger a massive Soviet military intervention to aid an Egyptian-Syrian counteroffensive. However, US documents released until recently provided no evidence that the American intelligence community, and particularly the CIA, detected this threat or informed the political leadership about it - even though some indications were picked up at the field level. A newly declassified, retrospective report appears for the first time to show that there was awareness of major components of the Soviet operation (preparations for a naval landing and parachute drop). But closer scrutiny finds that this report reflects Soviet propaganda more than factual intelligence - thus further tarnishing what has hitherto been held as an outstanding achievement for the Agency and its chief.
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| 2 |
ID:
073388
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper will argue that a central motive for the Soviet move was to halt and destroy Israel's nuclear development before it could attain operational atomic weapons; that this Soviet effort was accelerated by a direct message from Israel that despite its official ambiguity, it was bent on acquiring such weapons; that Soviet nuclear weapons were readied for use against Israel in case it already possessed, and tried to use, any nuclear device; and that the direct Soviet military intervention actually began with overflights of Israel's main nuclear facility by Soviet aircraft and pilots, in preparation for the planned attack on this target and/or in order to create such concern in Israel that would ensure its launch of a first strike.
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| 3 |
ID:
145505
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| Summary/Abstract |
Shortly before and after the USSR’s demise, a new literature emerged: memoirs by veterans of the Soviet Union’s massive military intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1960s and ’70s. Resurgent Russian pride, coupled with condemnation of its corruption by Soviet crimes, permitted startling disclosures. Tools we developed to evaluate these sources found them remarkably reliable and necessitated a reassessment of existing historiography. The Putin administration marked a reversal. Russian nationalism now stressed continuity with the USSR’s great-power status. ‘Falsification of history against Russian interests’ was criminalized. Some veterans resorted to purported ‘fiction’, which if challenged could be disclaimed. But under even stricter scrutiny, these narratives generally proved to reflect the authors’ actual experience, providing significant pointers for further research.
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