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| 1 |
ID:
102765
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| 2 |
ID:
063565
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| 3 |
ID:
129177
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| 4 |
ID:
147601
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s tough response to North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 raised expectations in the US, South Korea and Japan that Beijing might align its North Korea policy with the international community. Similar expectations were raised (and unmet) following North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling in 2010, a third nuclear test in 2013, numerous missile tests and military provocations in 2014–2015, and a fourth nuclear test and long-range missile test in early 2016. Many scholars and policymakers maintain that Beijing’s rationales for supporting Pyongyang are crumbling. This article argues that Chinese traditional worldviews and strategic thought remain motivating concepts for Beijing’s policy on North Korea. China’s norms in its near abroad—beliefs about stability, siege mentality, due deference and Confucian reciprocity—explain phases in Beijing’s policy on North Korea and why the Chinese approach does not change as much as external observers hope or expect.
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| 5 |
ID:
130609
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In February 12, 2013, North Korea announced it had successfully Conducted its third underground nuclear test. After such a dangerous move, the U.S. and South Korea tightened their bilateral security cooperation and beefed up defense measures. This caused tensions to escalate on the Korean Peninsula, and the situation appeared to spin out of control. The crisis pushed China and the U.S. together to work on this issue. This article will analyze those deep-seated factors affecting bilateral cooperation and make an initial exploration 'of its prospects while providing an overview of their joint actions to solve the North Korean nuclear issue.
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| 6 |
ID:
086130
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
U.S. presidents have struggled with the challenges posed by a hostile North Korea since the end of the Korean War and with the dangers of a nuclear North since the mid-1980s. The diplomatic struggle over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program has had many ups and downs, from the near outbreak of a second war in 1994 to an agreement a few months later to end the nuclear program, from the prospect of a visit to Pyongyang by President Bill Clinton in 2000 to the breakdown of the 1994 agreement in 2002 and the North Korean nuclear test in 2006, from limited arrangements over the past few years that have constrained Pyongyang's plutonium production program to recent disputes over verification.
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| 7 |
ID:
076139
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| 8 |
ID:
130548
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Purpose-This cross-national study examines differences in news coverage of North Korea's first 2006 nuclear test in newspapers from the countries involved in the six-party talks with North Korea.
Design/methodology/approach-This population study is based on a quantitative content analysis of 564 newspaper articles from the highest-circulation native-language daily newspapers in countries involved in the six-party talks: the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia.
Findings-The framing analysis provides the significant differences of the news coverage: the U.S. newspaper demonstrated the strongest war journalism framing, the Chinese newspaper the unanimous peace journalism framing, the Japanese and Russian newspapers strong peace journalism framings, and the South Korean newspaper the strongest neutral framing.
Practical implications-This study found that the highest circulated newspapers of the countries involved in the six-party talks used different frames covering North Korea's first nuclear weapons test.
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| 9 |
ID:
058754
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| 10 |
ID:
184568
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| 11 |
ID:
184569
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| 12 |
ID:
048536
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Knowledge world, 1998.
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| Description |
210p.
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| Standard Number |
8186019138
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 040340 | 327.54073/MAH 040340 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
131072
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| 14 |
ID:
099684
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2010.
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Korean issues in recent history and current affairs have been a remarkable and varied factor with respect to global and regional security and in relations between the United States and China-arguably the most important bilateral relationship in today's world. The extraordinary events and remarkable developments that compose this saga merit review, including many forgotten, unknown, or ignored developments and details. This examination is based on the author's experiences in various capacities, official and independent, over two decades. Much of it derives from his extensive contacts, conversations, and candid exchanges with People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) government officials, military officers (active and retired), think-tankers, and other scholars and specialists. It describes the ups and downs of relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and encompasses ROK-PRC and ROK-U.S. issues. The article concludes with a comprehensive analysis of the current debate in the United States and China on how to deal with North Korea and how to advise the Obama administration. The author lived the history, researched the intriguing details and startling twists and turns, and is now a constant close observer and sometimes active participant in the ongoing debate about how best to handle North Korea.
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| 15 |
ID:
120995
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There had long been speculation as to who would succeed Kim Jong Il, the ruler of North Korea. When he died in December 2011, it was his youngest son, Kim Jong Un who took over. Little enough is known about how N. Korea is run, but the difficulties of getting the country's leaders to modify their ways remain as great as ever. There were no obvious signs of change on the domestic front, though the military seemed somewhat less prominent. And continuity was also evident in relations with South Korea, now at a very low ebb. The issue of missile and nuclear development is equally bleak. The Leap Day Agreement with the US quickly became a dead letter, and as 2012 went on, North Korean belligerence was fuelled by UN resolutions. Much of this was routine theatre, but North Korea's third nuclear test on 12 February 2013 provoked sharper international criticism and a correspondingly shriller response from the North. In spite of calls for China to intervene, the real target for this hostility is the US. But with each side unwilling to engage except in terms that the other side finds unacceptable, it is hard to see how progress can be achieved.
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| 16 |
ID:
131615
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea probably can make nuclear warheads that are small enough to fit on its ballistic missiles, and activities at its nuclear test site and satellite launch facility likely indicate that Pyongyang is planning further tests to continue improving its nuclear arsenal, a former South Korean official said last month.
In a May 19 interview, the former official said that Pyongyang can "likely fit a nuclear warhead on a Rodong missile" although it is not certain that the warhead would detonate properly.
The medium-range Rodong missile, also known as the Nodong, is a deployed system with a range of 1,300 kilometers. This places South Korea, Japan, and parts of China within its range.
Experts have expressed skepticism in the past about North Korea's ability to deliver a nuclear warhead via a missile, but that sentiment apparently is beginning to shift.
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| 17 |
ID:
129106
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Castle Bravo nuclear detonation in the Marshall Islands. The U.S. military conducted 67 nuclear tests in the Pacific Proving Grounds from 1946 to 1958. The Castle Bravo test, conducted on March 1, 1954, at Bikini Atoll, was 1,000 times the force of the Hiroshima bomb. The explosion sent irradiated coral dust throughout the atolls. Neighboring atoll populations, who were neither informed of the tests nor relocated prior to the detonation, today continue to experience health issues, cultural upheaval, and physical dislocation due to the environmental degradation produced by the test and the effects of climate change. The Bravo detonation remains the largest nuclear test ever conducted by the United States.[1] Although the United States tested an additional 55 nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands, Castle Bravo is the most notorious due to its impact, primarily on the people of the Marshall Islands.
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| 18 |
ID:
073742
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| 19 |
ID:
129213
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| 20 |
ID:
130191
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The second year of Kim Jong Un's rule in North Korea was enormously eventful. The year began with Pyongyang carrying out its third nuclear test, a move of reckless brinksmanship that alarmed the region and beyond. North Korea formally declared its goal of ''simultaneously pursuing nuclear and economic development,'' but failed to take a decisive step toward economic reform. The ruthless purge and execution of Jang Song-taek revealed the structural weakness of the ruling system.
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