| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article reviews 17 Finnish crises since the Second World War from a perspective of three sets of questions derived from the theoretical literature. The questions deal with the construction of crisis, formation of the decision-making unit and rationality of decision-making. Although it is not possible to find a fully regular pattern of a particular type of crisis behaviour, some general observations can be made. In Finland, decision-making is often left in the hands of a small elite group, except in the case of civilian emergencies when key decisions are made at the operational level. The political elite, including the business community, have been fairly united and have rejected critical opinions during a crisis. Yet, contrary to some assumptions about the government using 'crisis' as a vehicle for acquiring more power, Finns generally avoid defining difficult situations as a 'crisis', instead reacting to them cautiously rather than in panic.
|