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ID:
159189
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cyberspace is an avenue of approach through which a military force can attain objectives of value. Through these cyber avenues of approach, military forces can engage, vet, organize, and direct human agents to accomplish specific activities. Although the objectives of these activities could differ from traditional military objectives, they still have military relevance. This particular manifestation of cyber conflict is neither a new domain of war nor something outside of warfare. Rather, it can be viewed as an emerging avenue of approach in the larger context of military operations, auguring benefits in the integration of cyber activities with operations.
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| 2 |
ID:
163994
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pragati Publications, 2018.
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| Description |
xxiii, 363p.: ill.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788173071720
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059593 | 327.51054/BHA 059593 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
172311
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since China opened to the outside world in 1978, Chinese negotiators have made considerable changes in the ways they consider negotiation, strategies to implement action, and tactics used. The underlying values of their practice have also undergone a notable evolution. However, there are dimensions which remain stable and constitute the core of what could be defined as the deep “Chineseness” of these negotiators. This essay provides insight into Chinese negotiation practice and its evolution.
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| 4 |
ID:
139967
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the centenary year of the dardanelles operation, the author uses the principles of war to analyse some of the reasons for the failure of the campaign.
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| 5 |
ID:
073650
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars of ancient China and students of military strategy have devoted considerable attention to Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Intelligence experts, in contrast, occasionally cite his chapter on 'The Use of Spies' but do not seem to engage his text. Part of the problem is the difficulty of translating his oracular adages; Western experts in Chinese history rarely understand the arcana of espionage, while intelligence scholars usually know no Chinese. Sun Tzu amply repays an effort to study his text, however, as he presents one of the oldest extant descriptions of an intelligence system - one that is, moreover, still insightful in our modern age.
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| 6 |
ID:
132002
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2014.
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The principles espoused in Sun Tzu's Art of War and Sextus Iulius Frontinus's Stratagematon that have linkages with the practice of special operations warfare are examined in this article. The academic study of special operations within the field of strategy has been hindered by the lack of resources in strategic theories that explain how special operations work and succeed. This article presents the discovery of principles of special operations which has been vividly described in both of these classical texts but often overlooked, and these principles can be matched with the contemporary practice of special operations.
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| 7 |
ID:
133757
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2014.
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Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin's use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia's will on Ukraine's eastern provinces. Russia's determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin's gains in Crimea.
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| 8 |
ID:
117106
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