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| 1 |
ID:
085136
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many observers of contemporary French politics would find it difficult to resist the temptation to conclude that France, alone among the European allies of the United States, has consistently had the greatest difficulty in adjusting to the reality of America's power. When that power occasions, as it frequently does, debates about "American empire," French opposition to American influence seems to become even more pronounced. In fact, there has in recent decades been a distinctive French negative assessment of the merits of American empire, but it would be a mistake, or so this paper argues, to assume that French interests have invariably been at odds either with American power or with American empire. Using four eponymous figures to illustrate the French perspective on American empire in the past 100 years, this essay highlights how and why that assessment has evolved.
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| 2 |
ID:
085130
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2008.
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Abstract "It is difficult to escape the conclusion," this historian has claimed in previous writings, "that in the foreign policy arena [Theodore] Roosevelt was probably the greatest of all US presidents." Such a laudatory interpretation is built on an assessment of both the record achieved by Rooseveltian diplomacy during the years of Roosevelt's presidency and the long-term significance of TR's statecraft. In its own time Roosevelt's foreign policy success grew out of a sophisticated understanding of a complex international environment, a well-conceived perspective on America's interests within that environment, and a multitude of attributes in the realm of execution that usually enabled Roosevelt, even in the most challenging cases, to attain the results he was seeking. As to its long-range importance, Rooseveltian statecraft was anchored to three precepts that might be labeled the "precept of broadly defined US interests," the "precept of US power," and the "precept of Anglo-American leadership." By conducting a foreign policy grounded on these precepts, Roosevelt - certainly well ahead of the great majority of his contemporaries - anticipated the type of foreign policy approach that would become and has remained the foundation for the practice of statecraft by many Republican and Democratic presidents and their most influential advisers from 1939 to the present day.
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| 3 |
ID:
165062
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This article disputes explanations of American expansionism that are based on the requirements of national security or more abstract theories such as the balance of power. In contradistinction to the imperatives of defence and survival, the article shows how civilisational factors weighed heavily on the emergence of US grand strategy at the turn of the nineteenth century. In particular assumptions about the peoples of the Third World being lesser played an important role in the conception and legitimation of imperial expansion. During this period, the US Navy went through a dramatic build-up. The article shows the ways in which the worldviews of many of the key players (such as Alfred Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt) contributed to the militarisation of global racism, a development that led to widespread killing in the Philippines and elsewhere.
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| 4 |
ID:
185597
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The debate over whether the United States should join the League of Nations, an intense and sometimes acrimonious battle that pitched Republican against Democrat, president against congress, and reservationist against irreconcilable, was fought on a complicated terrain. The world order as it had existed had been shattered, and a new battle emerged between world leaders over what might replace it. The question of how to deal with vanquished enemies was crucial, of course, as was the dispensation of colonial territory; the map of Europe and its imperial possessions would be redrawn. The role that the United States should play—militarily, financially, and politically—was a key question, and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson provided an answer with the promulgation of the Fourteen Points and the proposal for a League of Nations.1 For a surprising number of participants in the League debate, however, the question of world order turned not just on British Naval supremacy, German war reparations, or the borders of French territory, but on a problem half a world away from Europe: the Mexican revolution. Theodore Roosevelt probably put the connection in its starkest terms, in a phrase he used repeatedly in the columns he wrote about the proposed League in the weeks before his sudden death. “Mexico is our Balkan Peninsula,” he wrote in a denunciation of the League on Christmas Eve 1918, adding ominously: “Some day we will have to deal with it.”2
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| 5 |
ID:
085129
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that as the first modern US president and an innovative shaper of American foreign relations, Theodore Roosevelt launched the rising United States on the world stage as a major actor in power politics, that American diplomacy came of age with him and not with Woodrow Wilson, and that the secular pragmatist who succeeded because he was abreast of the times should not be begrudged the laurels that are so often bestowed on the religious-minded visionary who failed because he was ahead of his time. In American historiography Wilson has often eclipsed-unfairly and erroneously-the geopolitical and diplomatic skills, professionalism and expertise in foreign policy of Roosevelt. Even as ex-president, Roosevelt would be a force to be reckoned with. The use and misuse of a misconstrued legacy that some have tried to confiscate for their own benefit is perhaps best illustrated by presidential candidate John McCain's reverential claim that he is "a Teddy Roosevelt Republican" rather than a neo-Wilsonian.
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| 6 |
ID:
155287
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Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy as president was animated by a desire to see the United States play a leading role in world affairs. He utilized skillful diplomacy, energetic executive action, and credible naval capabilities to support this forward role, while avoiding strategic overextension. In Latin America, Roosevelt looked to forestall European intervention and secure U.S. predominance. In Europe and East Asia, he sought to promote regional balances of power, while working under strict constraints imposed by Congress and U.S. public opinion. In the end, Roosevelt navigated these constraints as well as international events with considerable success. His presidential tenure is a good example of American foreign policy realism in action.
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| 7 |
ID:
142869
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There is a broad consensus about the ways in which public opinion and domestic politics influenced American foreign policy during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. Historians generally concur that the American public was ignorant about and uninterested in international politics. They also agree that the president’s perception of public sentiment and his reading of the political landscape played essentially negative roles; that is, they were constraints at the point of implementation, rather than factors that shaped the substance of his policy, and were unquestionably a hindrance. Taking a fresh look at the origins of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine raises questions about this interpretation. Roosevelt believed that Americans were passionately opposed to the blockade of Venezuela by European Powers in late 1902 and early 1903 and viewed it as a threat to the Monroe Doctrine. This perception and Roosevelt’s 1904 presidential campaign therefore significantly affected the timing and content of the Roosevelt Corollary.
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| 8 |
ID:
073687
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The central argument of this article is that Theodore Roosevelt's worldview was formed at the intersection of geopolitics and cosmopolitan morality. The intellectual roots of his political and foreign policy convictions contributed to a diplomatic style for which the conventional labels of realism or idealism are both inadequate and misleading. Contrary to the stereotypical caricature of Roosevelt as an American architect of realpolitik, or ruthless man on horseback, he held a complex set of beliefs about international relations that transcends familiar academic theorising about either power politics or universal principles of morality. Neither the vision of international anarchy, nor the calculation of state capabilities, do justice to Roosevelt's sense of the interplay between values and power in foreign policy conduct. Moral principles, Roosevelt claimed, help make clear the inescapable tension between ideals and reality. The moral problem persists, he thought, because foreign policy involves political choices obscured by faulty perception, controlled by national interests, and complicated by multiple purposes and goals. Roosevelt's more nuanced worldview underscores the need for a revised historiography of international relations, one that builds upon the recognition that realists and idealists were never divided into clearly-identifiable camps either before or after the First World War.
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| 9 |
ID:
085135
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| Publication |
2008.
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This article explores links in the grand strategic outlook of Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt, with particular reference to the influence upon both men of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. It focuses upon an episode during Franklin Roosevelt's tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, when he was in direct correspondence with both Theodore and Mahan on matters of grand strategy and naval policy. The paper argues that Theodore Roosevelt proved a crucial conduit in the formulation of Franklin Roosevelt's grand strategic outlook, both through his promulgation of Mahanian thought and his support of Franklin's correspondence with the Admiral. This in turn would be important later during Franklin Roosevelt's leadership of the United States.
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| 10 |
ID:
085133
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Theodore Roosevelt's most enduring contribution to American power and influence in the world was in the promotion and construction of a blue water navy. Although much has been written about Roosevelt's notion of a uniquely American imperial vocation, as well as of his social Darwinist conception of Great Power competition, the priority he awarded to American naval power was based above all on a dispassionate and pessimistic interpretation of the direction of international affairs between 1890 and 1909. Bracketed by the inauguration of German Weltpolitik on the one hand and the Japanese naval triumph at Tsushima on the other, Roosevelt's naval policy was not the product of a romantic imperial imagination but rather of a wholly objective appreciation of the most fundamental imperative of American national security for the near and distant future.
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