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ID: 073701

Attack at Taranto: tactical success, operational failure / Caravaggio, Angelo N

Caravaggio, Angelo N	Journal Article
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Publication	2006.
Summary/Abstract	The 1940 British air attack on the Italian battle fleet at Taranto Harbor has rightly been celebrated. However, measuring the success gained against the objectives assigned, the attack can be assessed only as a limited tactical victory with limited operational impact-a priceless opportunity lost.

Key Words

Great Britain ; Italy ; Air Attack, 1940 ; Taranto Harbor

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ID: 073700

Geography, technology, and British naval strategy in the dreadnought era / Sumida, Jon Tetsuro

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro	Journal Article
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Publication

2006.

Summary/Abstract

Alfred Thayer Mahan and Admiral Sir John Fisher disagreed about capital-ship design and the utility of history as a guide to formulating naval policy, but the main difference between their ways of thinking about strategy was over the best means of defending the British empire in a maritime war. Where Mahan called for concentration at the center, Fisher contended that defense could be achieved at the periphery.

Key Words

Great Britain ; Naval Strategy ; Mahan, Alfred Thayer ; Fisher, John

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ID: 073699

Japanese maritime thought: if not Mahan, who? / Yoshihara, Toshi; Holmes, James R

Yoshihara, Toshi	Journal Article
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Publication	2006.
Summary/Abstract	Postwar Japan is a case study in strategy making without a larger theoretical framework. Imperial Japan's attachment to Mahanian strategic theory did not outlive World War II. Japan's break with Mahanian thought, however, is occurring at a moment in history when China's ambitions could usher in a new age of Mahan

Key Words

Maritime Strategy ; Navy ; Post-Cold War Period ; Japan ; Mahan, Alfred Thayer

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ID: 073702

Night session of the Presidium of the Central Committee, 22-23 / Fursenko, Alexander

Fursenko, Alexander	Journal Article
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Publication	2006.
Summary/Abstract	A Russian historian of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis argues from archival evidence that while authority to use tactical nuclear weapons was never delegated to local Soviet commanders, it was only with difficulty (and the assistance of the Navy commander in chief) that hard-liners were prevented from pushing through a potentially dangerous policy.

Key Words

United States ; Cuban Missile Crisis - 1962 ; Soviet Union

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