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| 1 |
ID:
170624
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| Summary/Abstract |
With respect to China and its neighbors, what are the political implications when a great power advances economically into small states? This paper presents an asymmetry–coercion linkage to explain the relationship between a great power and small states by reconceptualizing Albert Hirschman’s theory of trade dependency. This reconceptualization involves two tasks. First, the paper explicates vulnerability to coercion as a consequence of economic asymmetry, whereby a small state becomes susceptible to a great power’s compellence or co-optation to take a certain path preferred by the latter. Second, in demonstrating and measuring vulnerability to coercion, the paper accounts for the three factors: trade concentration, non-transparency, and reliance on bilateral aid. The combined effect of these three factors is that among the six countries under investigation, Cambodia and North Korea are extremely vulnerable to China’s coercion, while Vietnam is the least vulnerable state
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| 2 |
ID:
153721
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper seeks to understand why the United States treated Japan and Korea differently in the revisions of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. On the sensitive issue of grating its allies the rights of developing enrichment and reprocessing (ENR), the United States did so for Japan in the 1977 and 1987 revisions, but did not for Korea during the 2015 revision. For the great power as a supplier state, there are two factors affecting the decision: policy-makers’ concern about alliance management prior to the calculation of security outcome, and firms’ commercial interests. In order to avoid damage to the US–Japan alliance and to maintain Japan's complementation for the US nuclear industry, Washington granted the rights of ENR to Tokyo. In contrast, because of its confidence of managing the US–Korea alliance and partly because of incompatibility of commercial interests between the two, Washington did not grant the rights to Seoul at the 2015 revision. Based on the comparison of the two cases, this paper underscores a need to alter the power projection theory regarding nuclear proliferation by explicating the alliance management as the ex ante element of power projection and by accounting for commercial interests such as fuel sale and technological partnership.
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| 3 |
ID:
130623
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There were four critical undercurrents for the growth of Korean think tank in the 1990s: democratization. the end o/the Cold War. _globalization coupled with local autonomy, and the expanded government budget accompanying Korea's rapid economic growth. In contrast to American think tanks which are private but normally server as public policy advocates, most of the important Korean think tanks are supported by the government and they are not independent public policy advocates. the Korean think tanks are highly susceptible to domestic political dynamics for instance, the presidential office's power over the over the appointment of directors.
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| 4 |
ID:
073904
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2006.
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| Description |
xiv, 219p.
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| Standard Number |
041539922X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051655 | 327.5/FRI 051655 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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