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ID:
120721
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract Liberalization of trade and investment in services through trade agreements has progressed less than trade in goods. We review the limited progress achieved to date in the WTO and major regional agreements on services and possible explanations why trade agreements have not been more effective at integrating the services markets of participating countries. We argue that the prospects for both services liberalization and welfare-enhancing regulatory reform in the context of trade agreements can be enhanced through mechanisms that enhance transparency, dialogue and cooperation between regulators, trade officials and stakeholders.
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| 2 |
ID:
073975
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article studies whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. We test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, subsidies, and PAC contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the data. We make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model's quantitative implications, also found in recent studies. This solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decision-making process in real-world government. The results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge.
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| 3 |
ID:
159204
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Public procurement around the world tends to be heavily skewed toward local firms. This “home bias” has been falling in many countries, independent of whether states have agreed to binding disciplines on government procurement in a trade agreement. Extant research suggests that reciprocally negotiated market access commitments have not been very effective in inducing governments to buy more from foreign suppliers. In this article, I present data and review available research on home bias in procurement. I argue that the evidence suggests policy should put less emphasis on specific market access reciprocity through trade agreements in favor of a greater focus on learning about good procurement practices and principles, enhancing transparency and accountability, and pursuing pro-competitive policies more generally.
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| 4 |
ID:
180628
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China, the European Union, and the United States are the world's largest traders. They have a big stake in a multilateral system of rules to manage the inevitable frictions among interdependent economies organized on different principles. This paper discusses elements of the WTO reform agenda through the lens of positions taken by these three WTO members, identifying the extent of alignment on key subjects, including transparency, dispute settlement, and plurilateral negotiations. We draw on findings of a recent research project on WTO reform and use responses to an expert survey to assess the prospects for actions that all three trade powers might support. Our premise is that reforming WTO is a necessary condition for the organization to be a more salient forum for the three large economies to address trade tensions, and that agreement among these three trade powers, in turn, is necessary to resolve the problems of the WTO.
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| 5 |
ID:
146696
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2008, G20 leaders have repeatedly committed themselves not to resort to protectionism and to conclude WTO negotiations expeditiously. The jury is out on the extent to which they have lived up to the first promise; they have failed to deliver the second. Anemic global trade growth rates since 2010 imply that trade has not been a driver of much-needed economic dynamism. This paper argues that the G20 should pursue a more ambitious trade agenda and that there is much that greater leadership by the G20 could do to reinvigorate the trading system. A first step would be to commit to concrete actions that can be implemented by individual governments on a concerted basis and that center on reducing trade costs and improving access to services for firms. The Chinese presidency should also seek to have the G20 commit to more effective monitoring and analysis of trade policy broadly defined (including subsidies and investment incentives) and the impact of the many preferential trade agreements involving China, the EU and the USA, the world's largest trading powers.
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