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ID:
142870
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Aleph Book Company, 2016.
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| Description |
xxi, 425p.: mapshbk
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| Standard Number |
9789382277972
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058426 | 954.9045/VER 058426 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
113057
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2012.
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| Description |
260p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788124116760
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056622 | 327.54/FAB 056622 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
181256
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Gurugram, Penguin Random House India Pvt Ltd, 2021.
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| Description |
xxviii, 609p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780670088294
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060079 | 954.042/RAO 060079 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
174931
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| Summary/Abstract |
Though the Indian Navy was not directly involved in the conflict of 1962, it had by then slowly created a significant surface force and had one aircraft carrier but was yet to induct submarines. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), on the other hand, was primarily geared for coastal defence but had a growing fleet of submarines. The sole naval threat from the PLAN was the possibility of deployment of its submarines. Yet, on this anniversary of the 1962 war, it is clear that any future conflict with China will spread to the Indian Ocean through which the great trading power’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) traverse. These SLOCs are the potential targets and obviously require guarding. The growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean attests to that. This article attempts to put forth the maritime picture in 1962 so as to induce thinking on the Chinese maritime threat in the future.
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| 5 |
ID:
074051
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ID:
174929
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The non-use of offensive air power in the India-China conflict of 1962 is among the most discussed issues in the contemporary India-China discourse. There was a complete lack of understanding on the part of the strategic establishment of what offensive air power could achieve in Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Compounding this was a lack of clarity within the Indian Army of the value addition provided by the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) fighter fleet and a diffident approach on the part of the IAF leadership to espouse the use of offensive air power. However, the sterling contribution of the IAF’s transport and helicopter fleet during the conflict merits a re-examination.
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ID:
174926
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This article briefly recapitulates the 1962 war operations in the Kameng Sector to bring out the suggested manner in which operations should be conducted against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), should a need arise in the present time. Such threat from the PLA is very real keeping in mind present tensions on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
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ID:
170773
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For the Indian nation, the 1962 conflict with China has been one of the most traumatic post-independence events. For more than 3,000 prisoners of war (PoWs), the experience was particularly harrowing.
This article looks at difficult relations between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, the Indian Red Cross (IRC) and the Chinese Red Cross (CRC) Society. The ICRC’s archives in Geneva helped to understand the role of the international organization as well as of the two national Red Crosses and their respective governments during the conflict.
China not only refused to officially acknowledge the Geneva Convention of 1949 on PoWs, but also committed several violations in respect of the treatment meted out to captured Indian military personnel.
27 Military officers taken PoWs during operations were taken on a tour of china and repatriated on 04 May 1963.
The rosy picture painted by the Chinese propaganda had actually been a traumatic experience for the Indian PoWs.
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| 9 |
ID:
174927
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Legends in the military are born in martyrdom and adversity. In the isolated and desolate spots where soldiers serve, the melancholy quiet and deepening shadows of late evenings create illusions which bring to life the spirits of dead warriors. Soon shrines get created at such places to honour them. If the shrine is on a road, passers-by stop and pay obeisance. If it is off the beaten track, the martyr’s memory lives on in local folklore. In Arunachal Pradesh, the first category is Rifleman (Rfn) Jaswant Singh of 4th Battalion, the Garhwal Rifles. In the second is Havildar Shere Thapa of 2nd Battalion, the Jammu & Kashmir Rifles. The author tells the latter’s story intertwined with operations in the upper Subansiri in November 1962.
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| 10 |
ID:
092950
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Strategic historians and practitioners associated with the 32-day Sino-Indian border conflict of autumn 1962 have for long argued that India's appeal for US military assistance during the war led to the abandonment of India's foreign policy of non-alignment. By asking for military assistance, India entered into an alliance with the US. Triangulation of different accounts of the war, declassified US State Department Papers and correspondence between Indian leaders during the time of the war counter these claims. This article demonstrates how India's political elite, informed by cultural beliefs had in fact resisted allying with the US. Cultural beliefs, and not rational claims prescribing alliances, guided the strategic decision-making process in this period of national security crisis.
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| 11 |
ID:
174928
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| Summary/Abstract |
In July 2010, the Border Road Task Force (BRTF), while working on road improvement near Walong, uncovered a grave with the remains of a jawan of 4 Dogra who had died in the 1962 war. The battle of Walong occurred in the second phase of the 1962 war during the offensive in the Lohit valley. A bitterly fought battle, it was the only one in which the Indian and Chinese casualties were comparable. Interspersed with some autobiographical fiction, this article gives the account of a part of the battle of Walong where the only counter attack of the 1962 war was launched and the only planned withdrawal took place.
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