|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
074226
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2005.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The paper discusses a still more obvious foreign policy dilemma facing Denmark: On the one hand, Denmark has made a proactive foreign policy decision to pursue a strategy of influence with the European Union as the most important international forum. On the other hand, Denmark has chosen to stay outside the increasingly important cooperation on defence policy within the EU. As a small state, Denmark is opting for a multilateral strategy, but it has deliberately chosen to limit its commitment to the same forum. A combination of adaptation theory and theory of small states informs the analysis. It is argued that the Danish opt-out sends an unclear and inconsistent signal to Denmark's partners which again hampers the possibilities for using Danish coalition power within the EU. Nevertheless, contrary to both theoretical expectations and common sense intuition, there is little to suggest that the opt-out has had negative consequences for Denmark's influence on capabilities in the EU.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
098420
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article will analyse the challenges facing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) through an evaluation of the impact that differing member state strategic cultures have on the EU Battlegroup Concept, highlighted through the examples of Germany and Poland. The concept was initiated to give the EU an increased rapid reaction capacity. However, as emphasised through the cases of Germany and Poland, divergences in EU member states' strategic cultures remain, including when, where and how force is used. When this is combined with the cost of plugging military capabilities' gaps, the political willingness to deploy a Battlegroup can be affected. Whilst the article highlights that the role that member states want to play within CSDP as well as international expectations can override constraining factors, the Battlegroups rely on a rotation system. As some member states are more willing to deploy the Battlegroups than others, the concept risks becoming a declaratory policy thus undermining CSDP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
159684
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since January 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched over 30 civilian and military crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy. These missions have involved the participation of both EU member states and third states. In order to help facilitate the participation of third states in these missions, the EU established the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management, setting out the legal framework for third-state participation. In April 2015, Australia became the seventeenth country to sign such an agreement with the EU. This agreement reflects both the common interest and values shared by Australia and the EU and the extent to which EU–Australia relations have evolved and deepened over the years. In addition, the increased engagement and socialisation of Australian military and civilian personnel with individual EU member states through their participation in such operations as the International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Force have further facilitated opportunities for security cooperation at the EU level. Shared concerns and interests on counterterrorism, counter-piracy, instability and capacity-building have also opened up opportunities for increased cooperation between the EU and Australia. This article assesses the significance of the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management for EU–Australia relations within the area of security cooperation, and examines future prospects for cooperation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
112412
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that a holistic approach is important when studying the European Union's (EU) role as an international security actor, but at the same time it identifies problems in adopting such a comprehensive research agenda. The holistic approach entails that the research must include 'new' security problems, such as climate change, but also relevant policies and instruments outside the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, owing to conceptual, legal and political obstacles, this has been difficult to achieve; as a consequence, existing research on the EU as an international security actor tends to narrow down the focus to just one framework: the CSDP and its operations. This may lead to a distorted image, because the EU's role in international security surpasses any single policy framework. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it sets the framework for the comprehensive research agenda concerning the EU as an international security actor. Second, it identifies key obstacles that are making this holistic approach methodologically and conceptually difficult. In this context, the Lisbon Treaty, formally abandoning the pillar structure of the EU, provides an opportunity to mitigate at least some of these roadblocks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
154461
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides the framework for the contributions to this special issue. It first puts the theme into context and outlines the main issues that justify further analytical engagement with European Union (EU)–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relations to the extent we propose here. We then provide some historical background to frame the discussion, and in doing so also outline the current state of interaction between the EU and NATO. We then briefly contextualise the changing strategic environment shaping the relationship, including recent proposals to implement their declared “strategic partnership”. This introduction then presents an overview of the existing literature to set the stage for a renewed look at the research agenda that has emerged over the last two decades. We close with an outline of the individual contributions to this special issue, which are presented in two sections: one focusing on theoretical and conceptual approaches to the study of EU of EU–NATO relations, and one on the inter-organisational relationship in practice, followed by a concluding synopsis and outlook.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
108658
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The thrust of this paper concerns the case of the European Battlegroup (BG) non-deployment in late 2008, when the United Nations requested European military support for the United Nations Organisation Mission peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The argument is built on the fact that when, in official documents, the EU approaches the European security and ESDP/CSDP's military crisis management policy and interventions, it makes strong references to the United Nations and the UN Charter Chapter VII's mandate of restoring international peace and security. Such references make it seem that supporting the UN when it deals with threats and crises is a primary concern of the EU and the member states. These allusions lead to the main contention of this paper, that there is much ambivalence in these indications. The paper develops its argument from one key hypothesis; namely, that the non-deployment of a European BG in the DRC, at the end of 2008, constitutes a useful case study for detecting a number of ambiguities of the EU in respect of its declarations in the official documents establishing the European military crisis management intervention structure.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
183976
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Post-Brexit referendum EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) developments have called for an enhancement of Germany’s leadership in the CSDP. Given fears of German dominance, its self-limitation and diverging French visions, Germany is steered towards building deeper alliances and partnerships. Minilateral cooperation offers unique benefits to the current German leadership dilemma yet remains understudied outside of Western defence cooperation. Based on three representative areas of the CSDP, the article examines the progress and viability of minilateral CSDP cooperation between Germany and Visegrád countries and finds clear indications of growing post-2016 minilateral cooperation with this particular region.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
153339
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article makes a contribution to the little explored issue of evaluating the effectiveness of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Drawing on the interviews with local beneficiaries of two missions in Ukraine, one CSDP proper (European Union Advisory Mission) and the other a “hybrid” mission (EU Border Assistance Mission), the article analyses which factors shape the local beneficiaries’ perception of a mission being effective or non-effective. It shows the reputational approach deriving from the organisational theory can offer a fruitful theoretical framework for understanding CSDP perceived effectiveness on the ground. The article contributes to the studies of CSDP and its engagement with the host state as well as to the nascent academic and policy literature on CSDP and Ukraine.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
146997
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the little explored issue of non-state actor (NSA) participation in the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Despite the fact that NGOs and civil society are shielded from formal access to CSDP, EU staff in both Brussels and the missions engage with them informally. Drawing on interviews with policy-makers and NSA representatives, the article analyses the practices of the EU in its engagement with NSAs, focusing on civilian missions in Georgia and Palestine. It shows that such engagement is more intense during implementation at the level of CSDP missions rather than during policy-making in Brussels. It argues that a combination of rational choice-based (functional needs of policy-makers and intensity of NSA advocacy) and constructivist (organisational and individual cultures) explanations helps us better understand why CSDP structures open up to NSAs. The article contributes to the nascent academic and policy debate on EU–civil society cooperation in CSDP and, more broadly, to the studies of informal governance in the EU and NSA participation in international organisations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
177766
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Austria's security architecture has changed significantly following the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the country's accession to the EU in 1995, and the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s led to a re-calibration of the Austrian understanding of foreign and security policy. As a result, Austria became more engaged in international peace-keeping operations and was interacting more with international organisations (EU, NATO-PfP). Austria became more and more engaged with EU CSDP, which de-facto undermined the country's neutrality, even if the neutrality issue keeps coming up at the level of political discourses. The public assessment of perceived threats is shifted from more traditional threat categories (e.g. crime) towards new security challenges (e.g. immigration), but in general, Austrians feel extraordinarily safe in comparison with other European nations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
151388
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Defence and Security Procurement Directive (DSDP) is the first supranational policy in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and represents a departure from the standard understanding of the CSDP as intergovernmental. Whilst the member states were initially against such an initiative, the Defence Directive was eventually proposed in the Council in 2007 and accepted in July 2009. This paper examines why European Union member states changed their position on the proposal for a DSDP between 2004 and 2007. The analysis builds upon two hypotheses that aim to account for this change in position. Providing new insight into the views of the member states, the study finds that the member states accepted the Directive due to a sense of obligation to respect internal market rules, and further discusses the theoretical implications of these findings.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
129976
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Italian armed forces have undergone important transformations since the end of the Cold War. Exogenous changes in the strategic and operational environment have driven a reshaping of armed forces in all NATO countries, but the differences between the national responses that have emerged has not always been thoroughly analysed. Deep restructuring in military doctrine, field experience linked to intense force deployment and budgetary constraints interact in shaping the direction of transformation, sometimes in ways that deviate from classic hypotheses on what drives change in the military. The picture that emerges is a complex one, where relevant innovations co-exist with the persistence of problems that call into question the sustainability of the Italian defence model.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
117355
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The UK, with France, initiated the European, today Common, Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP) in 1998-9. A strong consensus on the need to address capability shortfalls, which the UK accepted to attempt under the EU flag, however masked the lack of consensus about the extent to which the EU would also make policy and launch operations (which would require permanent planning and conduct structures). This debate about the degree of EU autonomy vis-à-vis NATO and the US is one of the reasons why Europeans collectively have no strategic vision on the regions and scenarios for which they should assume responsibility, as the Libyan crisis demonstrated. But also on the capability side, the UK in the end never fully committed, withholding the necessary budget to allow the European Defence Agency to operate as intended and resisting moves towards military integration, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation, in favour of bilateral arrangements such as the 2010 agreement with France. Meanwhile, however, the US came to demand that Europe take charge, autonomously, of crisis management in its own neighbourhood. British policy now seems to have struck a dead end. London has managed to slow down the CSDP. NATO has seen even fewer results in capability development, but when it comes to operations, in the absence of US leadership NATO is equally blocked by the lack of a collective European strategic vision. London, with Paris, remains the only European actor able and willing to engage in crisis management and war, but cannot mobilize many other capitals to join in. Unlike the US, the UK does not have the means to go in alone if necessary. A fundamental revision of policy is needed if the UK wants to maintain its level of influence in security and defence.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
167401
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of the Cold War, the study of European defence has been dominated by a ‘Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)-centric’ approach, while largely neglecting the comparative analysis of national defence policies. This article makes a conceptual and empirical case for turning the dominant research prism of European defence studies upside down by returning the analytical precedence to the national level. This approach privileges the comparative analysis of national defence policies and armed forces, before focusing on the trans-/supra-national level. The case for this analytical turn is made in three steps. Firstly, it addresses the different historical stages in European defence integration and the transformation of national armed forces and thereby brings to light the recent renationalization of defence in Europe. Secondly, it questions the predominance of the CSDP in the scholarly literature on European defence. Finally, it seeks to demonstrate the fruitfulness of such a démarche by empirically substantiating common patterns and intra-European divergences in the evolution of national defence policies and armed forces since the end of the Cold War. After having shown the need and added benefit of turning the analytical lense of European defence studies on its head, the conclusion suggests future avenues of research on national defence policies and armed forces in Europe.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|