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| 1 |
ID:
074341
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| 2 |
ID:
130598
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Back in 1991 India articulated a Look East policy with the obvious objective of capitalising on the emerging potential in South East and East Asian regions. With her unique geographical position it was expected that the North Eastern part of India would serve as the land bridge between India and the emerging economies of these regions. In 2002, Bangladesh herself recognised the growing potential of the ASEAN members and other nations in the East Asian region and articulated her own Look East policy with a focus on exploring the
emerging economic opportunities. The immediate priority was to establish connectivity with the extended region through Myanmar.' However, despite occasional policy pronouncements from both sides, the Look East policy of Bangladesh could not really make much headway.
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| 3 |
ID:
131018
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Russia's approach to the post-Soviet space in relation to domestic stability during
I'utin's first two terms. It identi?es three dimensions of security which underpinned foreign policy during
this period-ideological, economic, and mi1itary~and demonstrates how each interacted with policies on the domestic front. Assessing Rnssia's response to Ukraine's Orange Revolution, it shows how the events of 2004 initiated a shift towards insulation from perceived external threats to political stability. A policy of "defensive imperialism" emerged whereby offensive actions abroad were aimed fundamentally at facilitating a stable external environment to politically safeguard the regime. The article concludes with a brief assessment of developments since 2008, and offers a pessimistic prognosis of the impact this trend will have on Russia's domestic stability and its international relations.
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| 4 |
ID:
126620
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Maritime territorial disputes have become a hot issue in regional security and a pressing issue for Taiwan's national security. While Taiwan is persistently claiming sovereign right over the large part of the South China Sea based on the U-shaped line, its role is however weakened as a result of the cross-strait hostility and its prolonged hands-off policy. Of course, its ambiguous international status, difficult relation with mainland China and domestic political confusion on nation's future have more to do with its inactive role in the South China Sea disputes. This insecurity contributes to its ambivalent policy. This articleintends to address Taiwan's legitimate claim for the part of the South China Sea, which has been unknown and neglected by the international community, and examine the reasons why Taiwan had taken inactive policy toward the South China Sea. Alerted by recent aggressive moves of other claimants, Taiwan is now shifting to a reasonable tougher strategy in the South China Sea. The articlealso projects the course of fresh efforts made by the Taiwan government pressurised by the public with increasing awareness of urgency.
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| 5 |
ID:
148836
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The global war on terror dramatically reinforced the significance of security in the Eurasian region, which had been seemingly on the wane since 1989, but the notion of security that came with it was different from that which had come before.1 In the post 9/11 world, security became a much more expansive, fluid and an uncertain concept. While the State employed traditional military means to achieve security, the State no longer seemed to be the container of security. Terrorism, as the primary security threat, seemed to render the stark division between external and internal threat meaningless. This uncertainty of security has multiplied the sites at which ‘security’ may be found. Traditional sites, such as militaries and conflict, have been rearticulated but they have been joined by border fences, detention centres, airport security counters, places of worship and even universities. However, even as insecurity processes become increasingly transnational and even global in their dynamics and scope, many States continue to be profound sources of insecurity both to other States and people.
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| 6 |
ID:
129478
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the fourth quarter of 2013, there are two cases which might bring implications for both Indonesia as well as ASEAN in the near future. Firstly, the change of government in Australia from the former Labour Party to a Liberal-National coalition has immediately created tension in the bilateral relations of Indonesia and Australia after some period of smooth and constructive relations especially in dealing with the threat of terrorism. The policy of the new administration under Prime Minister Tony Abbott to curb the numbers of boat people coming to Australia has been viewed by Indonesia as challenging its national sovereignty. The second important case is the result of the ASEAN Summit in Brunei Darussalam. The relative success of this
Summit, following a shameful failure of ASEAN to come out with a Joint Communique in Phnom Penh the previous year, has to some ex- tent brought ASEAN back on track towards establishing an ASEAN Community in 2015.
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| 7 |
ID:
126587
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2013.
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Using Malaysia's China policy as a case study of a smaller state's response to a rising power, this article challenges the mainstream neorealist notion that the growing capability and geographical proximity of a rising power tend to induce fear among its weaker neighbours. By tracing the transformation of Malaysia's China policy, the article's findings indicate that power asymmetry and geographical proximity have no inherent logic of their own; rather, whether and to what extent the two variables will prompt smaller states to become fearful and/or attracted to a rising power is often a function of intervening factors at the domestic level, i.e. the imperative of ruling elite's domestic legitimation. In the case of Malaysia's China policy, it is the ruling Barisan Nasional elite's desire to capitalize on the big power's rise-for the ultimate goal of enhancing and justifying its political authority at home-that has driven the smaller state to adopt a hedging approach characterized by an inclination to prioritize immediate economic and diplomatic benefits over potential security concerns, while simultaneously attempting to keep its strategic options open for as long as the systemic conditions allow.
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| 8 |
ID:
104812
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| Publication |
Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, 2010.
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| Description |
31p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056061 | 355.033054/AUS 056061 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
127775
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper reviews the perceptions of the CA states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and conceptualises the CA states' motivations and concerns in engaging in cooperation within the SCO vis-à-vis China. The message that this paper aims to deliver is that, for the majority of the CA leadership and public, China within the SCO represents the CA states' 'other', with decolonising but increasingly dominating features. These perceptions of China in the CA region elucidate the ways in which China's involvement in Central Asia has a paradoxical and contradictory impact on the potential for the SCO to move beyond functionalism and towards the creation of a broader SCO identity. Consequently, the future of the SCO may be more limited than the West fears and Central Asia hopes.
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| 10 |
ID:
146299
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THE ACTIONS of Barack Obama's administration in Latin America in some respects differ from what his predecessors were doing there. These differences emerged during his election campaign. It should be admitted that he has inherited an extremely beneficial legacy from George W. Bush, who, during his two presidential terms, failed to achieve his main goal in the region, i.e., to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), largely due to the leftist drift that emerged there in the early 21st century.
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