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ID:
186207
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| Summary/Abstract |
The operational and strategic effects associated with the creation of defensive bastions in the seas off China, in Eastern Europe, or the Persian Gulf have prompted extensive military debate. The article aims to contribute to this debate by speculating on the potential creation of an Algerian A2/AD bubble in the Western Mediterranean. Such a zone does not appear to exist, but Algerian military developments allow it to monitor air and naval movements in an area comprising the Straits of Gibraltar, the Balearic Islands and Sardinia and to increase its capability to deny access to these parts, thus consolidating an AD zone with potential strategic effects.
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| 2 |
ID:
158166
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article compares and contrasts the relations among the three Jewish underground groups in Mandatory Palestine ‒ the Hagana, the Irgun and LEHI ‒ with three anti-colonial national liberation movements: in Malaya, Algeria and Vietnam. It shows that the fact that the Jewish resistance movement had the fewest divisive elements enabled it to unite its three distinct components, however briefly (in 1945–1946), though the reappearance of the divisive factors led to the dismantlement of the united front and to each organisation conducting its own struggle for national liberation.
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| 3 |
ID:
115590
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| 4 |
ID:
017374
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| Publication |
Summer 1994.
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| Description |
149-163
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| 5 |
ID:
186295
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| Summary/Abstract |
The shattering Ottoman order in the early nineteenth century offers an intriguing puzzle about the behaviors of subordinates within declining hierarchical orders. While Greece, Egypt, and many other provinces challenged the Porte, Algiers preferred to remain within the Ottoman order. The puzzle turns into a riddle when considering that Algeria was bounded to the center in a loose way and uprising against the Porte was less risky and less costly. Why did a geographically remote and loosely integrated subordinate remain within the Ottoman hierarchical order at a time when well-integrated and geographically close subordinates, one after another, picked the challenge option? This paper proposes three factors, which may be more generally applicable to the clients of declining patrons: the inability of the Porte to force Algeria against its interests, which decreased the costs of continued allegiance; Algeria’s need for a balancer against threats from European naval powers, which the Porte provided; and the domestic political legitimacy that allegiance to the Porte also provided to Algeria’s rulers.
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| 6 |
ID:
187261
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Algeria is re-emerging as an active player in international politics following the Arab Spring uprisings that swept across the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010–11. But it has adopted a much different posture from the one it maintained during the 1960s and 1970s. The broadly accommodative attitude that Algiers previously exhibited towards the outside world has been replaced by a more combative stance. Military power has become its primary tool for managing inter-state disputes, and Algeria has stepped up its involvement in the domestic affairs of nearby states. These changes have contributed to the resurgence of conflict in North Africa at a moment when the regional order might well have moved in a more peaceful direction.
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| 7 |
ID:
179886
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| 8 |
ID:
125621
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| Publication |
2013.
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The Algerian war resituated the meaning of "Muslims" and "Jews" in France in relation to religion and "origins" and this process reshaped French secular nationhood, with Algerian independence in mid-1962 crystallizing a complex and shifting debate that took shape in the interwar period and blossomed between 1945 and 1962. In its failed efforts to keep all Algerians French, the French government responded to both Algerian nationalism and, as is less known, Zionism, and did so with policies that took seriously, rather than rejected, the so-called ethnoreligious arguments that they embraced-and that, according to existing scholarship, have always been anathema to French laïcité. Most scholars on France continue to presume that its history is national or wholly "European." Yet paying attention to this transnational confrontation, driven by claims from Algeria and Israel, emphasizes the crucial roles of North African and Mediterranean developments in the making of contemporary France.
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| 9 |
ID:
183020
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During the Algerian Civil War of the 1990s responsibility for both targeted assassinations of prominent politicians and political activists and largescale massacres was frequently ascribed to both the government and the Islamic insurgents of the GIA. The same was true of the more mundane but much more numerous level of individuals who fell foul of both sides in the conflict and were frequently the targets of both. Using material from the asylum tribunals of several western countries this article describes how the widespread fear among the Algerian population was the result of the strategies of the government and GIA that both sought to intimidate, punish and exact revenge at a personal level leading to a widespread social dislocation.
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| 10 |
ID:
121488
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| 11 |
ID:
137408
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| 12 |
ID:
009107
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| Publication |
April 1995.
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| Description |
247-267
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| 13 |
ID:
060161
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Winter 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As part of the Middle East Institute's commitment to promoting and advancing Middle East studies for the next generation, MEI in late 2003 announced the Mrs. Harley Stevens Award for the best essay on a selected theme by a graduate student at an American university. The award was named for Mrs. Harley C. Stevens, a longtime benefactor of MEI and the Middle East Journal, who died last year. The theme chosen for the first competition was democratization in the Middle East, with the essayists encouraged to write on a single case study. Under the terms of the competition, the editor of the Journal chose three judges: Amy Hawthorne of the Carnegie Endowment, Nathan Brown of George Washington University, and Stephen Buck, former US Foreign Service Officer, also formerly with National Defense University. The judges selected this article by Robert Parks (University of Texas), who received his award at the MEI Annual Conference last fall.
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| 14 |
ID:
029790
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| Publication |
London, Hollis and Carter Ltd., 1964.
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| Description |
424p.Hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 000904 | 909.0974927/NUT 000904 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
160874
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The conflict between the rebel group, the Polisario Front, and the Kingdom of Morocco is nearing its 43rd year. Though under-reported, the conflict itself garners attention for the resilience – some would say tenacity – of the ethnically Sahrawi Polisario Front. Despite shifting regional and international politics and the nearly 150,000 Sahrawi refugees waiting in nearby Algerian camps, the rebel group has survived. What explains its resilience? This article uses Bourdieu’s ‘forms of capital’ to understand the Polisario Front’s persistence. Based on field research in Algeria, Western Sahara, and the United States, it finds that social, cultural, symbolic, and economic capital may provide an explanation.
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| 16 |
ID:
184433
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| 17 |
ID:
104729
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| 18 |
ID:
102874
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| 19 |
ID:
128578
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| Publication |
2013.
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As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, 'How many troops does it take to get the job done?' This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several 'plug-and-play' equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, 'How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?
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| 20 |
ID:
071150
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