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| 1 |
ID:
116159
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In general, so it is argued in this article, the intelligence community would benefit from an agenda of greater and more conscious reflexivity. This increased self-awareness should as a minimum be applied to the areas of collection, analysis and communication, and it should bring members of the intelligence community to habitually reassess both procedures and standards of their work. Such a process promises to improve analysis, reduce misunderstandings in communication and increase public trust in the intelligence community. It will, in short, help the intelligence community prepare for a turbulent future.
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| 2 |
ID:
074368
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Employing the notion of 'rhetorical entrapment', this article offers a discussion of Ukraine's EU membership prospects. It argues that while, for material reasons, the EU may want to keep Ukraine at arm's length, normative commitments made earlier may compel it to offer much more. The study first looks at the domestic situation in Ukraine in light of the country's call for accession talks to be opened in 2007, before it goes on to analyse the distribution of support for and opposition to the Ukrainian membership perspective among the EU member states.
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| 3 |
ID:
137051
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A long-held axiom, political leaders are said to favour an action space sufficiently wide to allow them, as a minimum, a face-saving exit. This makes it particularly interesting for us to study those rare cases where political leaders seem to be deliberately reducing their policy options to the point of having merely one line to pursue. The handling by Russian President Vladimir Putin of the early 2014 crisis over Crimea, eventually leading to the annexation by Russia of the Ukrainian Peninsula on 21 March 2014, seems to represent such a rare case. Through the use of state-controlled media, a highly dichotomized framing of the crisis was presented to the Russian audience, essentially leaving Putin with just the one option of acting to “save” the Crimeans from the Ukrainian Government by bringing them into Russia
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