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1 |
ID:
124841
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
At the National Defense University (NDU) on May 23, 2013, President Barack Obama gave a major speech about terrorismarguing that the time has come to redefine the kind of conflict that the United States has been engaged in since the 9/11 attacks. Obama asserted that ''[w]e must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us.''1 Thus, the President focused part of his speech on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which Congress had passed days after 9/11 and which gave President George W. Bush the authority to go to war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies. Few in Congress who voted for this authorization understood that they were voting for what has become the United States' longest war, one that has expanded in recent years to countries such as Pakistan and Yemen
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2 |
ID:
124852
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Israel, the United States, and the international community must recognize the ugly truth: Hamas is winning, and it may be too late to reverse this trend. The current drift in policy should be replaced by coercing and incentivizing Hamas to renounce violence.
Hamas members are ''ants,'' declared Yasser Arafat, the father and long-/time leader of the Palestinian national movement, during a private speech in 1990. Its cadre, he went on, should cower in their holes lest they be crushed by Arafat's Fatah forces.1 Arafat's swagger seemed justified. Fatah had ruled the roost for decades, and after Hamas emerged in December 1987 as the first intifada erupted, the Islamist organization was on the ropes. After a few unimpressive attacks, Israel had quickly arrested over 1,000 Hamas members, including its top leadership.2 In 1989, less than three percent of Palestinians in Gaza, where Hamas would later prove strongest, supported the organization.3 Journalist Zaki Chehab claimed Hamas' military wing only had twenty machine guns as the intifada wound down.4 Fatah, it seemed, would remain the dominant
force in the Palestinian National Movement.
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3 |
ID:
135600
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Publication |
DelhI, Neha Publishers and Distributors, 2015.
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Description |
288p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
9789380318639
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
058047 | 303.625/LOH 058047 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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4 |
ID:
074613
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5 |
ID:
124836
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Given the differences between the geographical and socioeconomic basis of the origin of the state in Afghanistan and Europe, it is but obvious that their nature would also differ. The Afghan state directly and indirectly involved various religious institutions, like mosque and Islamic scholars in its day-to-day politics
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