| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite decades of research on coercive diplomacy, the linkage between deterrence and compellence still remains unexplored. The present essay provides both a theoretical and empirical analysis of why studying their linked relationship is desirable. After overviewing the literature, it investigates the interplay between US strategies of deterrence and compellence in the First Gulf Crisis (1990-1991), suggesting that the deterrence-compellence linkage is stronger when the two strategies coexist or after they have coexisted. In particular, such a linkage was absent at the beginning of the First Gulf Crisis but very much present from the middle of the crisis until its end. Although this essay represents only a preliminary foray into exploring the potential linkage between deterrence and compellence, it appears that a better grasp of this relationship could provide us with the tools to counteract as well as reduce the negative effects of miscalculation and misperception, practices that are partially responsible for unpredicted and unwanted outcomes in international politics.
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