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| 1 |
ID:
105659
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| 2 |
ID:
158436
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2017.
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| Description |
xiv, 128p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789386457264
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059377 | 355.03301823/DWI 059377 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
130407
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Budgetary pressures have driven a steady expansion of armaments collaboration projects internationally. This has also been the case in Europe where it is estimated that currently one-fifth of European procurement budgets are spent on collaborative weapons systems and the European Defence Agency has the long-term objective of increasing this figure by over 50%. The purpose of this article is to assess whether collaborative armaments projects can offer the benefits frequently attributed to them. To this end, the study examines the five combat aircraft projects that European states have collaboratively undertaken since the 1950s.
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| 4 |
ID:
130033
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2014.
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Two years ago president Dmitry Medvedev and Minister Anatoly Serdyukov stated that military reforms are 'practically' complete. It looks premature now. Serdyukov managed to fulfill only 'quantitative' part of reforms. The 'Serdyukov' reforms will follow the path typical of the majority of Russian reforms. They focus on meeting certain formal measures and characteristics (in the case of military reform, this includes the size of the armed forces, the number of units, the new structure and so on) and, at the same time, avoid making decisions that would require radical changes in the country's political and social life.
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| 5 |
ID:
074740
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| 6 |
ID:
144604
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| Summary/Abstract |
After the collapse of the Soviet Union [2], the Russian military rotted away. In one of the most dramatic campaigns of peacetime demilitarization in world history, from 1988 to 1994, Moscow’s armed forces shrank from five million to one million personnel. As the Kremlin’s defense expenditures plunged from around $246 billion in 1988 to $14 billion in 1994, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the government withdrew some 700,000 servicemen from Afghanistan, Germany, Mongolia, and eastern Europe. So much had the prestige of the military profession evaporated during the 1990s that when the nuclear submarine Kursk [3] sank in the Barents Sea in 2000, its captain was earning the equivalent of $200 per month.
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| 7 |
ID:
130225
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2014.
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That a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) took place in the early 1990s is widely known. The concept was born of technological, political, social, and economic changes that were to fundamentally alter the future of warfare, introducing a completely new type of military and organizational structure for the effective projection of force.
Though most experts accepted the reality of a fundamental transformation in the practice of warfare, few saw that a parallel revolution was occurring in the intelligence world, even though this specific field of national security was undergoing similar challenges and change.
That a "Revolution in Intelligence Affairs" in the 1990s and early 2000s actually occurred and its effects has become increasingly evident. This "intelligence revolution" resulted from a combination of changes in international politics, information technologies, and socio-political context.
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| 8 |
ID:
173248
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The August 2008 war of Russia against Georgia, showing severe shortcomings in Russia’s military capabilities, made Moscow realize that modernization of its armed forces was inevitable to effectively use military power as a policy instrument. Hence, a military reform plan (2008–2020) was initiated. This article demonstrates how since September 2015, Moscow’s army has utilized the Syrian conflict as a testing ground for its military reforms. What conclusions can be drawn from the use of Russian military power in Syria, in relation to its military modernization?
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| 9 |
ID:
130860
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2014.
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Despite widespread perceptions, Russia is close to having the military it needs. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the leaders of the Russian Federation faced the unenviable task of creating national armed forces using what was left of the Soviet military. Plans to provide 'traditional' defence and to meet future challenges were considered as early as 1992, leading to a string of reform programmes over the next two decades. Such efforts were closely observed by analysts in the West and Russia, who documented the drawn-out process in a large body of literature. The assessments provided in the bulk of these works were almost unanimous: the reforms had failed, leaving the Russian armed forces 'impoverished, demoralized and largely ineffective', 'woefully inadequate to address the country's security threats' and standing 'perilously close to ruin'.
During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, the reforms were seen as botched jobs that merely reduced troop numbers, essentially leaving Russia with a smaller version of a Soviet-style, mass-conscription army. The latest push for change, announced in the wake of the country's 2008 war with Georgia, during which the performance of the Russian military was widely criticised, met with a warmer reception, at least initially. It envisaged a comprehensive shift away from low-tech to high-tech; from conscription to professionalism; and from mass to mobility. Some structural changes, such as the transition from divisions to brigades and the streamlining of central command, were executed with impressive speed, raising expectations that Russia was finally on its way to acquiring a 'modern' military. As time went on, however, observers noted a range of problems that, in their eyes, dampened the prospect of ultimate success. The Russian defence industry remained unable to produce advanced equipment. The possibility of ending conscription and moving towards an all-volunteer force seemed to be as remote as ever. Moreover, the 2010 military doctrine continued to emphasise mobilisation, instead of focusing on permanent readiness and rapid reaction. When Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov was replaced by Sergei Shoigu - a long-standing ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin - in November 2012, some experts argued that the 2008 reforms were in effect 'dead'.
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| 10 |
ID:
132446
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2014.
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This article assesses the recent attempts to reform the Russian military and the future prospects of successful reform. Despite serious social and economic ailments, Russia should still be able to modernize its military; however the key obstacles to reform lie in its leadership's inability to shape existing resources into military capabilities. First, the article examines the decay in Russia's manpower, defense budgeting, and defense industrial base. Second, the article surveys the security environment in which Russia must tailor these strategic resources. However, the state of these resources and Russia's security needs do not justify the capabilities that the Russian military has developed. Therefore, the article identifies Russia's inability to transform resources into capabilities as the missing link in military reform. Specifically, these poor 'conversion capabilities' include dysfunctional civil-military relations, misguided threat assessment and strategy formulation, and opaque doctrine. Finally, the article concludes that absent any external existential threats or a military disaster, successful military reform is unlikely, with implications for both the threshold at which Russia decides nuclear weapons are necessary as well as its perceived need for strategic depth.
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| 11 |
ID:
148217
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The Chinese military has embarked on a series of organizational and doctrinal reforms intended to better enable it to fight modern war. Prominent among these reforms is the growing emphasis on space to enable long-range precisions strikes and on counterspace to deny space capabilities to an adversary. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has officially designated space as a new domain and established an organization to command space forces. With this increased focus on space, the PLA may begin to develop a doctrine to govern the use of space in military operations. The higher priority given to space, especially space control, by the PLA coincides with similar actions by the US military, increasing the possibility of warfare in space and the risks of escalation.
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| 12 |
ID:
127891
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2013.
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Why are some states more willing to adopt military innovations than others? Why, for example, were the great powers of Europe able to successfully reform their military practices to better adapt to and participate in the so-called military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while their most important extra-European competitor, the Ottoman Empire, failed to do so? This puzzle is best explained by two factors: civil-military relations and historical timing. In the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of an institutionally strong and internally cohesive army during the early stages of state formation-in the late fourteenth century-equipped the military with substantial bargaining powers. In contrast, the great powers of Europe drew heavily on private providers of military power during the military revolution and developed similar armies only by the second half of the seventeenth century, limiting the bargaining leverage of European militaries over their rulers. In essence, the Ottoman standing army was able to block reform efforts that it believed challenged its parochial interests. Absent a similar institutional challenge, European rulers initiated military reforms and motivated officers and military entrepreneurs to participate in the ongoing military revolution.
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