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| 1 |
ID:
107161
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fact that democracies maintain peaceful relations with each other is regarded as one of the few law-like correlations in international relations, but the causes of this empirical phenomenon remain contested. This paper tries to fill this theoretical gap by attributing the remarkable stability between democracies to inter-democratic institutions. At the same time, it contributes to the debate on the need to differentiate among international organizations in order to assess their peace-building effects. We identify transnational and trans-governmental linkages as crucial features that distinguish inter-democratic from traditional institutions with non-democratic or mixed membership. In order to explain these institutions' peace-building effect, we analyze the impact of international institutions on rivalry mitigation with a view to five pairs of states: France-Germany, Greece-Turkey, Argentina-Brazil, Indonesia-Malaysia, and Japan-South Korea. Those dyads all look back at a history of rivalry, conflict, and mutual threat perceptions, and they are located in highly institutionalized regional settings but vary with regard to their political regime type. The controlled comparison of cases demonstrates that the embeddedness of international institutions in transnational and trans-governmental linkages corresponds to each member's regime type and that these institutional differences are responsible for the varying extent of rivalry mitigation.
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| 2 |
ID:
144453
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How do religious civil wars evolve? Many violent conflicts are fought between groups of different faiths. The paper argues, however, that religious differences rarely directly lead to conflict onset. Rather, the apparent religious dimension of many civil wars is a consequence of successful religious framing. Political and military leaders offer religious interpretations designed to legitimize the use of force and to mobilize believers to violent action. Such framing processes can be more or less successful, depending inter alia on the authority of the political and religious leadership, on the coherence and appropriateness of the frames, on the existence of persuasive counter-frames, and on the availability of communication infrastructures that allow for effective dissemination of religious frames. Comparing violent conflicts in the Philippines and Thailand, the paper shows that religious mobilization can fail along the theoretically predicted lines.
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| 3 |
ID:
144448
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| Summary/Abstract |
The papers of the special issue analyse intra-state conflict escalation and armed rebellion from a framing perspective. Following Robert Benford and David Snow, framing is understood as strategic communication to mobilise a constituency for political action through persuasive ‘collective action frames’.1 Such collective action frames comprise the identification of common grievances and responsible actors (diagnostic frame), possible solutions to the identified problems (prognostic frame) and sufficiently strong reasons to push a constituency into political action (motivational frame). In our understanding, ‘collective action frames’ can mobilise people for various forms of contentious behaviour (including armed rebellion), but they can also fail to resonate with the audience. Thus, we expect political violence to occur only if framers make a convincing and resonant ‘call to arms’. In order to show that collective action frames indeed matter for various forms of political violence and most importantly civil war, the special issue investigates two aspects in detail: First, the contributions trace the selection and development of collective action frames (in particular those that propagate violence) and analyse the framing strategies deployed by movement leaders. Second, the authors of this special issue seek to explain why some ‘calls to arms’ resonate and make a constituency support an armed group, whereas others fail to ‘sweep the audience’.
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| 4 |
ID:
074795
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The international organisation of the democratic peace matters. Interdemocratic institutions are particularly suited to block escalation pathways between states and to prevent conflicts from resulting in war. This article builds on findings from three fields of research: (a) the liberal analysis of the democratic peace; (b) systemic approaches to international institutions, and (c) new quantitative studies of armed conflicts. Three pivotal contributions of international institutions to peaceful conflict management are identified: international institutions can be used to overcome the security dilemma among states and to tame power competitions. They sustain international cooperation and forestall the recourse of governments to unilateral self-help strategies. Finally, international institutions increase the autonomy of issue areas, which decreases the risk of destabilising spillover effects from other issue areas. The article holds that these three functions are extraordinarily well performed by international institutions composed of democracies and illustrates this allegation by presenting three case studies of interdemocratic management of former rivalries. Therefore, the distinctive features of interdemocratic institutions merit more attention as a supplement to the explanation of the democratic peace.
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| 5 |
ID:
123694
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AbstractIn this article we argue that trust is fundamental to post-agreement negotiations in the field of international security. We present our concept of interstate trust and discuss its relation to two core mechanisms of international cooperation: control and policy integration. Our main hypothesis is that growing trust reduces a dyad's reliance on control and leads to intensified policy integration. To specify how the trust-control nexus and the trust-integration nexus structure post-agreement negotiations, we first assume that post-agreement negotiations are likely to follow interstate crises. Second, we theorize crisis reactions and differentiate between low-trust and high-trust situations. In low-trust situations, a crisis indicates a failure to control the actions of others. As a response, demands for institutional reform will stress new and improved control mechanisms. In high-trust situations, the trusting bias defuses most of the doubts about the other's cooperative preferences and points to miscommunication as the principal issue. Therefore, negotiations will be about intensifying policy integration. States do so for three purposes: sustaining valuable integration, overcoming the crisis, and building trust. As a first plausibility probe for our argument, we look at post-agreement negotiations between France and Germany.
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