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SMALL PARTIES (2) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   165249


Political parties and federally structured incentives in Indian politics: the case of the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) / Manikandan, C; Wyatt, Andrew   Journal Article
Wyatt, Andrew Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Political parties in India operate in a federal system. The incentives that encourage parties to form and seek office have a federal structure. Changes in India’s multilevel political system have accommodated the growth of new parties. At the national level small parties have had many opportunities since 1989 to participate in national coalitions. The Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), as a small party, has responded to this federal incentive structure. The PMK has been excluded from government in its home state of Tamil Nadu but was frequently a coalition partner of the union government between 1998 and 2009 (being rewarded with cabinet posts). An emerging party leader, Anbumani Ramadoss used his ministerial experience at the centre to enhance his image and prepare for a larger role at the state level. This article shows how fragmentation of the national party system and the different levels of the federal system gives opportunities to small parties to develop.
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2
ID:   074854


Why small, centrist third parties motivate policy divergence by / Adams, James; Merrill, Samuel   Journal Article
Adams, James Journal Article
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Publication 2006.
Summary/Abstract Plurality-based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small, centrist, third parties. We modify the standard two-party spatial model of policy-seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party, and we show that the presence of such a party-even if it has no chance of winning-motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party. We derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three-party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of that equilibrium. We show that, over time, the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party. The predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar Britain.
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