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| 1 |
ID:
074948
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| 2 |
ID:
074950
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| 3 |
ID:
074949
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| 4 |
ID:
074952
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines economic policymaking in Indonesia from the eve of the 1997 financial crisis to 2005 and asks whether engagement with the IMF widened or narrowed the choices available to Indonesian policymakers. It argues that engagement with the Fund expanded the menu of policy options available to the government when the IMF could count on a powerful internal champion that was ready to use its relationship with the Fund to strengthen its own position in the domestic political game. However, the Fund's actions had the effect of constraining policy space in decline, when a champion failed to materialize at all, or when the trust between the Fund and the country authorities deteriorated rapidly.
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| 5 |
ID:
074953
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India survived near-crisis situations twice in the 1990s. How did internal and external constraints shape that country's ability to respond to the crises? This article argues that India's success can be attributed to four sets of decisions taken during the period 1991-1997: devaluation, involvement of the IMF, partial liberalization of the domestic financial sector, and gradual opening up of the external sector. The article analyzes the options, political opposition, and eventual outcomes for each set of decisions. India's ownership of its reform program helped set the pace of reform, while close interaction between technocrats and the IMF added credibility. But the balance between entrenched traditional interest groups and the demands of new interests determined the scope of reform.
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| 6 |
ID:
074954
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When apartheid ended in South Africa in 1994, the incoming democratic administration inherited a political system, economy, and social system infrastructure in profound crisis, as well as an external financial crisis. It did not borrow from the International Monetary Fund. Having fought hard for sovereignty, the new government was unwilling to cede influence to the IMF (or World Bank) or indeed to acquire any dependence on external creditors. Instead, the government of national unity embarked on its own home-grown structural adjustment program. Reconstruction and development, which were planned within fiscal limits that critics allege were far too tight, were accompanied by institutional and policy changes (such as trade liberalization and greater central bank autonomy) designed to encourage international investment.
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| 7 |
ID:
074955
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turkey's deep financial crisis in 2000-2001 implicated the International Monetary Fund program, adopted in 1999, while the IMF was associated with the successful 2001 recovery program. This article, through studying three critical interventions, finds that the IMF's impact on the policy choices available to Turkey's policymakers varied according to the history of the IMF's engagement with Turkey, the interests of major shareholders in the IMF, and the credibility of Turkey's leaders in the eyes of the IMF. The IMF's engagement substantially affected domestic politics in Turkey by strengthening the voice of economic technocrats within the government. The IMF thus became a contested actor in domestic politics. The crisis had very significant negative economic and social effects, which contributed to a deep political change in 2002.
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| 8 |
ID:
074956
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
By the end of 2001, Argentina faced economic recession, a collapse in its banking system, and an external sovereign debt crisis. While preemptive action earlier in the year might have made one or more of these crises less severe, preemption was a political orphan at home and abroad. The country's long-standing relationship with the International Monetary Fund brought with it a mutual dependence: the IMF had come to embrace Argentina as a symbol of the success of its policy advice, and Argentina had come to rely on the IMF's endorsement and occasional financial support to navigate the choppy international markets. That relationship deepened along with Argentina's growing difficulties in the run-up to default. IMF support was used to put off a correction of the overvalued currency and debt restructuring. A new Argentine policy regime and a new, more adversarial relationship with the IMF emerged only after devaluation and default.
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| 9 |
ID:
074957
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Malaysia did not turn to the International Monetary Fund for assistance when pressure from the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis hit the country. The country was less vulnerable than its neighbors, not least because it had earlier imposed limits on foreign borrowing and prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector. Although Malaysia's pathway through the 1997-1998 crisis included an orthodox adjustment program of the type the IMF would have required, this program was soon reversed in favor of reflationary monetary policies and the imposition of a short-term capital control regime. These responses took place against a backdrop of political intrigue and drama, but they reflected an underlying pragmatism and recent history of using capital controls and of not turning to the IMF.
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| 10 |
ID:
074958
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article reviews four recent publications on the Bretton Woods institutions with a focus on how commentators perceive and address the current crisis of legitimacy affecting these multilateral financial organizations, notably the challenges facing the International Monetary Fund. Taken together, these publications provide an excellent and timely cross section of analyses of the IMF's operational framework and political program at the most crucial juncture in its institutional history.
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| 11 |
ID:
074951
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The International Monetary Fund is often perceived as imposing harsh policies on countries facing financial crisis. A comparison of six countries affected by the pressures of the 1990s suggests more subtle effects. In Malaysia, India, and South Africa, policymakers kept the IMF at arms length to permit a more gradual and heterodox adjustment, including capital controls in India and Malaysia. By contrast, Argentina, Turkey, and Indonesia were bound tightly into the embrace of the IMF. However, this did not push policymakersto take tough decisions. Rather, IMF loans to Argentina and Turkey permitted policymakers to postpone difficult choices as both they and the IMF sought to protect previous policies and loans. In Indonesia, by contrast, borrowing from the IMF opened up a conduit for larger political pressures that brought down the Suharto regime.
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