| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
By the end of 2001, Argentina faced economic recession, a collapse in its banking system, and an external sovereign debt crisis. While preemptive action earlier in the year might have made one or more of these crises less severe, preemption was a political orphan at home and abroad. The country's long-standing relationship with the International Monetary Fund brought with it a mutual dependence: the IMF had come to embrace Argentina as a symbol of the success of its policy advice, and Argentina had come to rely on the IMF's endorsement and occasional financial support to navigate the choppy international markets. That relationship deepened along with Argentina's growing difficulties in the run-up to default. IMF support was used to put off a correction of the overvalued currency and debt restructuring. A new Argentine policy regime and a new, more adversarial relationship with the IMF emerged only after devaluation and default.
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