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ID:
166152
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Summary/Abstract |
Of the ten fastest growing economies since 1960, eight are in East Asia. As Haggard (2018) aptly demonstrates for Northeast Asia, two explanations account for this exceptional regional performance. On the one hand, neo-liberals committed to an Anglo-American night-watchman state (Krueger 1978; Bhagwati 1978; Edwards 1993; World Bank 1993; Pack and Saggi 2006) attribute performance to macroeconomic stability, provision of public goods, and openness to trade and investment. On the other hand, a heterodox group (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990/2004; Chang 2002, 1994; Rodrik 1995; Evans 1995; Lin 2009) focuses on market and coordination failures and the need for states to adopt pragmatic, ‘trial and error’ and selective approaches to high-speed growth. In this latter view, the strong developmental states of Northeast Asia used their embedded autonomy viz the private sector to overcome market and coordination failures to usher in rapid growth and technological catch-up.
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2 |
ID:
074957
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
Malaysia did not turn to the International Monetary Fund for assistance when pressure from the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis hit the country. The country was less vulnerable than its neighbors, not least because it had earlier imposed limits on foreign borrowing and prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector. Although Malaysia's pathway through the 1997-1998 crisis included an orthodox adjustment program of the type the IMF would have required, this program was soon reversed in favor of reflationary monetary policies and the imposition of a short-term capital control regime. These responses took place against a backdrop of political intrigue and drama, but they reflected an underlying pragmatism and recent history of using capital controls and of not turning to the IMF.
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