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| 1 |
ID:
015989
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| 2 |
ID:
030921
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| Publication |
Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1962.
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| Description |
viii, 127p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 000054 | 967.3/PAN 000054 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
132308
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates how perceptions of China in Mozambican civil society are affected by entrepreneurial activity and bilateral cooperation between China and Mozambique - real, imagined, visible and legal as well as clandestine and illegal in the agricultural and forestry sectors. The research problem concerns how discourse on Chinese investors is formed in Mozambique. Two questions are posed. How does Mozambican civil society perceive their room to maneuver at a time of Chinese growing economic interest and 'return' to Africa? What views exist on the policy space for the national government? Using qualitative ethnographic interviews to answer these overarching questions about expanding/contracting maneuvering space, this article explains how Mozambique's largest social group - peasants - the National Association of Small Farmers (UNAC) and other societal actors perceive Chinese investors. Informed by theoretical debates on civil society, the article argues that coinciding with China's large-scale return to Africa, an already tense dynamic between civil society and the state is picking up speed. It is argued that this phenomenon is likely to have more to do with African governments accruing more power and policy space than through direct impact of Chinese economic activity on African social life. However, to avoid negative discourse formation, China and host governments need to become more open on and transparent about bilateral agreements.
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| 4 |
ID:
116434
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis. Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion-and consequently, regime durability-by providing institutionalized access the spoils of power. We argue, by contrast, that while elite access to power and spoils may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, it often fails to do so during crises. Instead, the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion-and durability-in party-based authoritarian regimes. Origins in violent conflict raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the party's hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable.
We apply this argument to four party-based competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact and regimes survived.
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| 5 |
ID:
101151
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the role of bilateral donors and conditional aid in Mozambique's successful post-war peace process. The literature on peacebuilding has tended to privilege the role of UN missions in explaining the outcomes of post-civil war peace processes. The important role that bilateral donors may play in determining these outcomes has not been thoroughly studied. In Mozambique, donors with country experience, knowledge of domestic political actors and constraints, and a shared commitment to a successful outcome, were indispensable to the success of the peace process. The article details this engagement, arguing that it was not UNOMOZ alone, but UNOMOZ as supported by the flexible responses of these donors, that provided an effective third-party guarantee of the peace agreement in Mozambique. It briefly discusses the broader implications of this finding for understanding international peacebuilding efforts.
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| 6 |
ID:
098597
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2010.
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Climate change, rising oil prices and concerns about future energy supplies have contributed to a growing interest in using biomass for energy purposes. Several studies have highlighted the biophysical potential of biofuel production on the African continent, and analysts see Mozambique as one of the most promising African countries. Favorable growing conditions and the availability of land, water and labor are mentioned as major drivers behind this potential. Moreover, the potential of biofuel production to generate socio-economic benefits is reflected in the government's policy objectives for the development of the sector, such as reducing fuel import dependency and creating rural employment. This article provides an overview of biofuel developments in Mozambique and explores to what extent reality matches the suggested potential in the country.
We conclude that biofuel developments mainly take place in areas near good infrastructure, processing and storage facilities, where there is (skilled) labor available, and access to services and goods. Moreover, our analysis shows the need to timely harmonize current trends in biofuel developments with the government's policy objectives as the majority of existing and planned projects are not focusing on remote rural areas, and - in absence of domestic markets - principally target external markets.
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| 7 |
ID:
115829
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
FOREIGN INTEREST IN LARGE LAND ACQUISITIONS IN AFRICA began to hit the headlines in 2007 and 2008. China, a net food importer since 2004, was seen as one of the chief players in this rush for land. Mozambique has often been cited in support of the widespread conclusion that the Chinese government is directly seeking land in Africa for China's own food security.1 This briefing shows that the much-circulated picture of Chinese agricultural activities in Mozambique is closer to fiction than fact. That the conventional wisdom on Mozambique can be so far from reality calls into question the picture in other African countries as well.
Worries about the developmental impact of large-scale land investment are well-founded. Large land transfers are bound to raise alarms, and more so if the land is communally owned or occupied by subsistence farmers, or in a food-deficit region. Furthermore, many believe that Chinese companies will not simply invest in a search for profit, but will act primarily to advance Beijing's national security goals.2 Chinese foreign investment in land evokes fears of loss of national control, hence the parallels that are frequently drawn with neo-colonialism.
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| 8 |
ID:
148270
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This paper examines the class relations emerging in a contract farming scheme in Mozambique. Debates in the literature about contract farming characterise this market arrangement as leading to farmers losing control over production at the hands of capital. By discussing both the drivers and impacts of changes in the division of property and labour, this paper reveals a complex class structure in which the pressure of merchant capital on farmers is internalized within households and transferred onto workers and sharecroppers. This challenges the pertinence of conventional policy that prescribes empowering contract farmers without considering their varied class positions and interests.
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| 9 |
ID:
117648
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2012.
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The Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974 toppled the authoritarian regime in Lisbon. It is fallacious to conclude, however, that the 1974 coup d'état signaled Portugal's defeat in the Colonial War. The status of each conflict on the eve of the Carnation Revolution varied, and it was by no means inevitable that Portugal would have been defeated in all three theatres had the coup not occurred. This brief research note therefore advances a novel approach to examining the Colonial War by assessing the outcomes prior to the 1974 coup. In particular, the author proposes that Portugal achieved military victory in Angola and Mozambique, but was defeated in Guinea-Bissau.
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| 10 |
ID:
149707
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| 11 |
ID:
142477
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In 2014, the South African government announced Operation Phakisa in order to stimulate the country's blue economy. Operation Phakisa's strong focus on maritime economic matters ignores two unresolved issues in respect of South Africa's maritime economy and maritime diplomacy, namely the country's extended continental shelf claim. If successful in its claim, South Africa's territory will increase significantly (thus a 10th province) and thus its security and economic opportunities and challenges. The latter includes the exploration and exploitation of extended shelf resources such as oil and gas, gas hydrates, seabed mining, and marine genetic resources. As very little legal precedent and state practice exists in respect of the actual delimitation of the extended continental shelf, South Africa's claims, which overlaps with that of its neighbours Mozambique and Namibia, could contributes to significant insecurity between these states. The paper concludes with some policy recommendations to address the overlapping claims, and promote an Indian Ocean–South Atlantic dialogue on oceans governance and maritime security cooperation.
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| 12 |
ID:
159554
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Think tanks in competitive authoritarian regimes are implicitly if not explicitly oppositional, producing and disseminating research critical of government policies and elite behaviour. Existing literature asks how and why such think tanks emerge and survive, and if they exercise real influence. This paper asks if anyone actually reads their critical research. Focusing on two cases in Mozambique – the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE) and the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) – three original data sets are examined: (1) citations in the bibliographies of end-of-programme theses of undergraduates in the political science, public administration, economics, and/or sociology departments of two of Mozambique's most important universities; (2) websites and Facebook activities – visits, downloads, etc.; and (3) citations in academic journals that publish on Africa. Findings show evolving demand for these think tanks’ research, suggesting their growing status within Mozambique and, by implication, within civil societies of similar competitive authoritarian regimes.
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| 13 |
ID:
075021
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is explores UNDP's SSR activities in Mozambique, from the last stages of the post-civil war DDR programme until the beginning of 2005. It focuses primarily on the police force while looking at similar efforts in the judicial sector. It also focuses on how UNDP's strategic planning capacity and programme approaches affected the outcome of reforms sought. Finally, it analyses the constraints of Mozambique's SSR that affected its progress and implementation, including the rationale for embarking on reform and the persistent resistance to change by national institutions.
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| 14 |
ID:
086265
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a case study of Goan Mozambicans - a diasporic group created out of the itinerant quality that characterized Portuguese (de)colonization in the Indian Ocean. Many chose to emigrate from Portuguese India to Portuguese Africa between the 1920s and 1950s. That some Goans chose to stay while others left in the aftermath of Mozambican independence (1975) is also tied to this migratory history. An ethnographic life history approach is employed to access individual varied experiences of migration. Findings will suggest that Goan Mozambicans occupied an ambiguous position in the colonial order of things, and identify them as local cosmopolitans in postcolonial Mozambique.
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| 15 |
ID:
141996
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| Publication |
New Delhi, G B Books, 2015.
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| Description |
xii, 168p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789383930241
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058371 | 333.76054/DAS 058371 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 16 |
ID:
185761
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 1992 peace accords ending a 16-year civil war, followed by the 1994 democratic elections, promised a brighter political and economic future for Mozambique. Despite the adoption of multiparty politics and robust economic growth since the 1990s, however, Mozambique today faces seemingly intractable challenges. Amid increasing allegations of electoral fraud, Frelimo continues to be the country’s ruling party, a position it assumed after independence in 1975. Political insiders control most of the country’s considerable economic assets, including vast natural gas deposits in the north. A violent jihadi insurgency, which began in the northern province of Cabo Delgado in 2017 and tapped into local grievances, has so far resisted the combined efforts of the national military, regional security forces, and a contingent of troops from Rwanda to eliminate it. With spaces for peaceful civic participation and action shrinking, the glimmer of hope for democracy, security, and well-being in Mozambique is fading.
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| 17 |
ID:
184183
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A violent extremist group poses a significant threat to parts of Cabo Delgado province. Since its first major attack in October 2017, it has perpetuated a conflict to the detriment of sections of the population and government, as well as disrupting economic development. Little is known about the group and there is a considerable amount of confusion in policymaking and academic circles about the nature of the violent extremists (VE) and their relationship to the wider global Salafi-Jihadi community. By analysing the theological underpinnings of VE and their action in Cabo Delgado (CD), we bring clarity to this debate to enable international actors and policymakers in Mozambique navigate the complexities of the situation. From this analysis we conclude the following: VE are not Salafi-Jihadis as they do not share their ideological and theological understanding of the world. It is more accurate to present VE as challengers to the established order. Their struggle is best understood as a challenge to authorities to secure increased political and religious representation, and socio-economic benefits in CD.
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| 18 |
ID:
182426
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Insurgency has gained prominence in Africa. It is usually associated with marginalisation, poverty, and inequality and often has religious links and bases. Insurgency frequently originates in communities situated along the borders of a country but soon spreads to neighbouring countries due to the poor response from the concerned state. The literature reveals that when state institutions ignore insurgent groups, they utilise that window of time to network with terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) to solicit funds, arms and ammunition and training of new recruits and existing members. This was the case with Boko Haram, which was initially ignored by the Nigerian government only for it to become a security threat to the entire West African sub-region. An Islamic group, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ) has recently emerged in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province with the aim of creating an Islamic state within the region. Drawing from the Boko Haram experience in West Africa, this article critically assesses the short- and long-term security threats that this group poses to Mozambique and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and explores the strategies that could be deployed to combat the insurgency before it becomes a fully-fledged security challenge.
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| 19 |
ID:
163548
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Mozambique is rapidly emerging as one of the leading energy producers in Africa. We develop a comprehensive scenario analysis to review the energy revolution in Mozambique. Like much of Africa, Mozambique features a competition between development of its vast reserves of renewable energy and fossil fuels. We assess the implied energy and emissions transitions as well as the potential impact of a range of sustainable policy options. Our analysis reveals an emerging ‘energy dichotomy’, where a spectacular expansion of energy production goes together with an only gradual energy consumption transition. We find that over time the share of modern renewable energy sources tends to marginalize in the energy production mix while remaining stable in the energy consumption mix. About one-third of the GHG emissions associated with energy production can be linked to energy export. Also, we find that sustainable energy policies at the supply side lead to far higher cumulative emission reductions than demand-side policies. Finally, we show that even in the long run, a complete ban on thermal electricity generation capacity in Mozambique would by no means lead to shortages in the domestic electricity market but only slightly limit potential electricity export.
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| 20 |
ID:
151522
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Strenuous efforts by donors and lenders over four decades turned Mozambique from a socialist success story into a neoliberal capitalist one. The private sector dominates; a domestic elite dependent on foreign companies has been created. But a secret US$2.2 billion arms and fishing boat deal involving Swiss and Russian banks and Mozambican purchases from France, Germany, and Israel, with large profits on all sides, was a step too far down the donor’s capitalist road. The International Monetary Fund cut off its programme and western donors ended budget support.
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