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ID:
075085
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The world's major oil-consuming nations, led by the USA, China and the Western European countries, are keenly interested in the development of African oil reserves, making huge bids for whatever exploration blocks become available and investing large sums in drilling platforms, pipelines, loading facilities and other production infrastructure. Indeed, the pursuit of African oil has taken on the character of a gold rush, with major companies from all over the world competing fiercely with one another for access to promising reserves. This 'oil rush' has enormous implications both for African oil producers and for the major oil-importing countries. For the producing countries it promises both new-found wealth and a potential for severe internal discord over the allocation of oil revenues (or 'rents'); for the consuming countries, it entails growing dependence on imports of a vital substance from a region of chronic instability, with obvious national security overtones. Both these trends are reflected in US policy towards African oil. Desperate to procure additional supplies of foreign oil (to make up for the decline in domestic output), the Bush administration has made strenuous efforts to increase the role of US energy firms in African production. But because instability in Africa is an obstacle to such investment, it has sought to boost the internal security capacity of friendly African states and has laid the groundwork for direct US military involvement in Africa. At the same time Washington has become deeply concerned by China's growing interest in African oil, provoking an intense competitive contest between the two, with growing military overtones. In the end African societies will most probably suffer from this competition as an influx of arms bolsters the capacity of entrenched African regimes.
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| 2 |
ID:
126815
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Up until recently Peak Oil was a major discussion point crossing from academic research into mainstream journalism, yet it now attracts far less interest. This paper evaluates the reasons for this and on-going relevance of Peak Oil, considering variations in predictive dates for the phenomenon supported by technological, economic and political issues. Using data from agencies, the validity of each position is assessed looking at reserves, industrial developments and alternative fuels. The complicating issue of demand is also considered.
The conclusions are that, supported by commercial interests, an unsubstantiated belief in market and technical solutions, and a narrow paradigmatic focus, critics of Peak Oil theory have used unreliable reserve data, optimistic assumptions about utilisation of unconventional supplies and unrealistic predictions for alternative energy production to discredit the evidence that the resource-limited peak in the world's production of conventional oil has arrived, diverting discussion from what should be a serious topic for energy policy: how we respond to decreasing supplies of one of our most important energy sources.
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| 3 |
ID:
163239
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study shows how the level of corruption matters in the way oil rents affect a state's military spending. Using panel data covering the 1984–2014 period for the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), we find that the effect of oil rents on military budgets depends on the extent of political corruption. Oil rents are negatively associated with military spending of the GCC countries. However this, in turn, is moderated by higher levels of corruption. For comparison, we examine this association in non-GCC countries in the MENA region, finding a positive effect of higher oil rents on military spending: this effect is larger in corrupt polities within non-GCC countries. The intermediary role of corruption in the military-oil nexus is robust, controlling for a set of variables that may affect military spending.
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| 4 |
ID:
074991
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| 5 |
ID:
166299
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| Summary/Abstract |
OPEC procedures dictate that all member states should notify the volume of their crude oil reserves to the organization secretariat so that OPEC would reflect the figures in its official published materials. Many OPEC states say that it is not feasible to investigate the amount of their oil reserves through independent observers, believing this is a confidential issue. In fact, a contradiction appears to exist between the data for each oil field and the figures publicly announced for the fields on aggregate. This comes under the pretext of existing doubts about the volume of declared reserves.
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| 6 |
ID:
129379
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