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| 1 |
ID:
189831
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| Summary/Abstract |
After 2013, Turkey’s foreign policy has been noted for neo-Ottomanist
rhetoric and anti-Western discourse, which resulted in the deterioration
of relations with the West. To disclose the patterns of anti-Westernism
in Turkish foreign policy, this paper analyzes official speeches of Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan given at international meetings and
events from 2014 to 2021. Based on critical constructivism, which
underlines the co-constitutive relationship between identity and
foreign policy, and the role of the Other in identity construction,
this article demonstrates how the Western Other has been used by
Erdoğan in building Turkish Ottoman identity. This article articulates
the anti-Western notion of neo-Ottomanism and argues that Erdoğan’s
anti-Western discourse bears the Islamic undertone and relies on the
delineation of the Turkish-Ottoman Self from the Western Self.
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| 2 |
ID:
134010
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, I argue that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan wanted to improve relations with Syria because he wanted Turkey to play a leading role in the Arab world. This role is promoted by the United States which aims at creating an alliance between Turkey and the Arab states to block Russia, China, and Iran from having access to the East Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean. Turkey's reward would be to have access to Arab markets and oil. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was tempted by the United States, Turkey, and conservative Arab regimes to sever his ties with Iran, which he refused to do. Therefore, the former powers supported the Syrian uprising (which started as domestic protests against dictatorship, corruption, and misrule) to topple al-Assad. However, two and half years since the Syrian uprising started, the al-Assad regime seems to be resisting the attempts of his opponents to topple it, which would mean a failure of Erdogan in his political bet and might even lead to his downfall, especially after the eruption of protests against Erdogan throughout Turkey in early June 2013.
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| 3 |
ID:
187047
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides analyses as to how foreign policy affects domestic politics, in particular the AKP’s struggle with Kemalism. It examines how Kemalism was delegitimized through the initial democratic, pro-European Union and pro-West discourse of the AKP. It then analyzes Kemalism’s marginalization under the civilizational, neo-Ottoman discourse advanced by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Finally, it explores Kemalism’s alienation through the opposition CHP, which has been impacted by the neo-Ottoman discourse, as currently constructed. It concludes that the AKP’s struggle with Kemalism did not end even when it established control over the state and when the ideological Kemalist nation-state identity was replaced by a new content in the form of an Ottoman-Islamic civilization. The article relies on a method of interpretative analysis of the AKP and Kemalist movements.
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| 4 |
ID:
152087
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rise and subsequent erosion of friendly relations between Iran and Turkey was a result of their regional ambitions. While Turkey had long seen its secular system as presenting an alternative to Iran’s Islamic ideology, the alignment of their regional interests facilitated a rapport between the two states in the first decade of the twenty-first century. However, the Arab Spring proved divisive for this relationship as each state sought to advocate its model of government and secure a leadership role in the Arab world. The war in Syria widened the divide, as Iran’s long-standing support for the Bashar al-Assad regime could not be reconciled with Turkey’s desire to see President Assad out of office. Using a close reading of Persian and Turkish sources, the authors will analyse the Iran–Turkey divide, focusing specifically on how the Iranians have portrayed it as a clash of civilisations, citing Turkey’s so-called ‘neo-Ottoman’ ambitions as the primary cause.
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| 5 |
ID:
187477
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the role of ideas and identities in the making of the AKP’s foreign policy in Turkey. After briefly examining the institutional and international constraints on Turkish foreign policy before 2002, the discussion turns to the driving factors in three evolutionary stages of AKP’s foreign policy. It becomes apparent that a neo-Ottoman worldview and accompanying identity constitute the interpretive framework of the AKP’s political elite. The article traces how this worldview became dominant in Turkey’s policy making after the government dismantled the country’s Kemalist institutions and the AKP consolidated its political power.
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| 6 |
ID:
185544
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| Summary/Abstract |
After coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party evoked the ‘glory’ of the Ottoman past, seeking to expand Turkey’s cultural sphere of influence to the former territories of the Ottoman Empire – a phenomenon commonly referred to as neo-Ottomanism. While neo-Ottomanism is generally discussed as a component of foreign policy, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency’s (TIKA) intervention in the heritage dynamics of foreign countries was intimately linked with domestic policies. This paper discusses how neo-Ottomanist policies selectively created transnational heritage sites, and how these sites have dialectically become instruments of domestic politics.
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| 7 |
ID:
142296
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyzes how the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) understanding of new nationalism, or neo-Ottomanism, incorporates the logic of masculinist protection in its discourse. This necessitates a security-oriented state that firmly connects domestic politics with foreign policy. The concept of the logic of masculinist protection, borrowed from Iris Morrison Young, refers to the reinforcement of a gender hierarchy in politics, and signifies a paternalistic state charged with protecting a society identified with femininity.
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| 8 |
ID:
154894
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay investigates the ideational aspect of contemporary Turkey’s identity politics and international conduct and compares these to Russia’s. Over the past decade, several analysts have speculated that Russia and Turkey could form a strategic axis based on the shared vision of “Eurasia” and that there is similarity between Moscow’s and Ankara’s strategic outlooks: Russian neo-Eurasianism and Turkey’s Kemalist Eurasianism. Yet the outlook that defines Ankara’s understanding of Turkish national interest is not so much a permutation of Eurasianist ideas as it is a homegrown postimperial (and post-Kemalist) strategic vision, also known as neo-Ottomanism. Despite their philosophical affinity, neo-Eurasianism and neo-Ottomanism contain significant potential for confrontation.
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| 9 |
ID:
156099
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay proposes an alternative concept – Ottomentality – in order to more adequately assess Turkey’s growing neo-Ottoman cultural ensemble. This concept is deployed here to underscore the convergence of neoliberal and neo-Ottoman rationalities and the discursive practices that are developed around them for governing culture and managing a diverse society. The essay contends that the convergence of these two rationalities has significantly transformed the state’s approach to culture as a way of governing the social, constituted a particular knowledge of multiculturalism, and a subject of citizenry increasingly subjected to exclusion and discipline for expressing critical views of this knowledge.
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| 10 |
ID:
075079
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| 11 |
ID:
180693
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| Summary/Abstract |
The shift in bearing on the traditional status quo Turkish foreign policy orientation has recently been studied through various approaches commonly associated with changing trends, to seek the theoretical and methodological pillars that underpin the state’s policy behaviours towards new regions, including Africa. Accordingly, over the last two decades, ideas, linguistic constructs, identity, and religious and cultural factors have been added to an overarching and homogenous vision of Turkish foreign policy. Although identity-based theoretical studies explain dynamic changes in the Turkish foreign policy paradigm towards new regions, several of them fail to touch on how Turkish identities are translated into state policy. This article aims to address this by arguing that the effect of personality and leadership on the policymaking process of Turkey has become more visible over the last two decades, in tune with Turkey’s identity (neo-Ottomanism, Islam), which then evolves into state policies. The article opens avenues for further academic studies on two fronts. It accounts for the theoretical background of Turkey’s attachment to Africa through a constructivist approach, while responding to how Turkey’s identities are translated into state practice, an issue not sufficiently addressed in current literature.
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| 12 |
ID:
165290
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the Turkish government’s attitude towards Israel during the first years of the AK Party’s rule, as reflected in several military operations by the IDF. The article examines the various responses of Turkish politicians and journalists during the operations and attempts to answer the question of whether the AK Party holds anti-Israel stances or if its members’ responses were confined to the discussed operations only.
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