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ID:
126733
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article will demonstrate that in 1963 the administration of President Kennedy helped create a Ba'th regime in Iraq and then provided it with assistance in order to secure U.S. interests, including access to oil and the containment of both Communism and Arab nationalism. On February 8, 1963, the Ba'th overthrew the dictatorship of General 'Abd-ul-Karim Qasim, an Iraqi nationalist who was seen by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations as a threat to U.S. interests. U.S. policy makers provided the Ba'th regime with military and economic assistance, including sales of military equipment, credits for agricultural surpluses for credit under Public Law 480, and Export-Import Bank loans. Policy makers also encouraged private U.S. businesses to sign contracts with Iraq, supplied the Ba'th regime with ammunition to use against Kurdish rebels, used the Central Intelligence Agency to provide it military equipment, and ignored the Export-Import Bank's policy that prohibited financing arms sales.
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| 2 |
ID:
075126
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| 3 |
ID:
094621
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| 4 |
ID:
143861
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| Summary/Abstract |
Historians have long recognized the significance of Article 14(d) of the Geneva Agreement, which helped precipitate a refugee exodus from northern Vietnam. The origins of the clause itself remain obscure, however. This study argues that the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower played a critical role in pushing for the clause's inclusion in the Geneva settlement. Thwarted in its efforts to save the French in Indochina by military intervention, and forced to acquiesce in the conceding of territory to Ho Chi Minh, the administration's support for the article was an exercise in diplomatic and domestic damage limitation. In addition, the clause formed part of the administration's post-Geneva strategy aimed at bolstering Ngo Dinh Diem and the rump southern polity left in the wake of Vietnam's partition.
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| 5 |
ID:
146039
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan within the study of Anglo–American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain’s economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain’s maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources.
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