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| 1 |
ID:
111728
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO), serving as the representative of thePalestinian people, unveiled the Palestinian PeaceInitiative which would have established a state on 22% of historic Palestine- their own country from which they were expelled in 1948. The initiativepromised that Palestine would live in peace and security next to Israel, whichwas a major historical compromise that eventually took the Palestinianpeople years to absorb. In response, Israel did not only refuse the deal,but also sought to pursue its construction of illegal settlements even moreaggressively in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) defined bythe 1967 occupation. Current public opinion polls show that 60-70% ofPalestinians continue to support this peace initiative.
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| 2 |
ID:
170714
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the applicability of the confederative model to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Based on a comparative examination of successful and failed federative/confederative experiences in the 20th century, it argues that applying this solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will prove highly challenging if not wholly impossible. This is mainly because of the power asymmetry between two parties; dissimilar political systems (democratic vs authoritarian/dictatorial); restricted Palestinian sovereignty; failure to recognise Jewish self-determination; and the likelihood that this arrangement will need to be imposed
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| 3 |
ID:
075297
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| 4 |
ID:
138328
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the spring of 1988 the first intifada was in its early months and had already achieved two big accomplishments: It had fully mobilized the Palestinian population in a way not seen in prior resistance to the occupation, and, it had won for the Palestinians worldwide attention and considerable sympathy for their plight. There was, however, a gaping hole: the absence of strategy. When you asked Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) about how the intifada was to lead to the independent Palestinian state they said they were seeking, you got one of two answers: Either they said that the issue of grand strategy was up to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), or they invoked the idea of an international conference in which the Palestinians would be represented by the PLO and at which, somehow, the great powers — primarily the United States — would force upon Israel a Palestinian state and an end to the occupation.
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| 5 |
ID:
152469
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few grassroots-based coalitions from a “peripheral” region have affected high international politics to the degree of creating a global domino effect. However, the process that led to Brazil’s declaration of Palestinian state recognition on 3 December 2010, followed by regional and worldwide echoes of similar actions, provides a pertinent illustration. This analysis examines the winding road to the declaration, focusing on the domestic circumstances that conditioned this Brazilian policy. Using process tracing and content analysis techniques, it describes how a pro-Palestinian Transnational Advocacy Network grew in its degree of institutionalisation, political access, and popular mobilisation, managing to constrain Brazilian policy-makers’ preferences. The findings suggest some novel insights about the changing nature of diplomacy and the role of civil societies in the “Battles for Legitimacy” that characterise contemporary global politics.
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| 6 |
ID:
177747
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents an alternative approach to the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As the one-state solution is generally unacceptable to both Israel and the Palestinians and the two-state solution does not seem to be working, the authors suggest a possible ‘second-best solution’. Under this proposal a prospective Palestinian state would extend from the Gaza Strip to adjacent parts of the Sinai Peninsula for which Egypt would receive either financial or territorial compensation by the extension of its territory westwards to areas currently administered by Libya.
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| 7 |
ID:
030377
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1983.
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| Description |
x,190p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0674652215
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 023203 | 956.04/HEL 023203 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
154294
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| Summary/Abstract |
srael must either end the occupation without further procrastination and pretext, and work with the Palestinians to build their own state or, pending a future final settlement, grant equal rights in the meantime to everyone subject to Israeli jurisdiction.
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