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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
075374
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We investigate the problem of detecting the presence of clandestine neutron sources, such as would be produced by nuclear weapons containing plutonium, within cargo containers. Small, simple, and economical semiconductor photodiode detectors affixed to the outsides of containers are capable of producing statistically robust detections of unshielded sources when their output is integrated over the durations of ocean voyages. It is possible to shield such sources with thick layers of neutron-absorbing material, and to minimize the effects of such absorbers on ambient or artificial external neutron fluxes by surrounding them with neutron-reflective material.
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| 2 |
ID:
084091
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There have been a number of nuclear non-proliferation successes (Germany, Iraq, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Libya, Syria) and failures (USSR, France, China, India, Pakistan, probably Israel, North Korea [DPRK]), and at least one potential proliferator (Iran) whose future is uncertain. The successes are heterogeneous: some resulted from direct military or paramilitary action, while others followed changes in the political situation that removed the strategic rationale for or the willingness to pay the economic and political price of proliferation. The failures have in common a proliferator that perceived a compelling strategic need for nuclear weapons. Such countries resist outside pressures, and may reap the benefits of proliferation even if their weapons are untested. I consider the relevance of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treat to proliferation in light of this history.
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| 3 |
ID:
077379
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The problem of detecting a nuclear weapon smuggled in an ocean-going cargo container has not been solved, and the detonation of such a device in a large city could produce casualties and property damage exceeding those of September 11, 2001 by orders of magnitude. Any means of detecting such threats must be fast and cheap enough to screen the millions of containers shipped each year, and must be capable of distinguishing a threatening quantity of fissionable material from the complex loading of masses of innocent material found in many containers. Here we show that radiography with energetic X-rays produced by a 10 MeV electron accelerator, taking advantage of the high density and specific atomic properties of fissionable material, may be a practical solution
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