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ID:
155065
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.
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| 2 |
ID:
075486
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| 3 |
ID:
184558
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article analyzes the data obtained in a survey that involved twenty
leading Russian experts specializing in international security, arms control,and strategic stability. The survey was conducted in December 2021. The
respondents were asked to name factors that, in their opinion, currently have
(2022) or will have a tangible impact on strategic stability in the foreseeable
future (until 2036) and to list them in the order of their significance. In
addition, they were asked whether and how these factors would be taken
into account in the future. Two time frames were chosen for analysis: up
until the year 2026 (when the “extended” START-3 Treaty will end) and up
until the year 2036 (when a possible nuclear arms control agreement that
may replace START-3 will expire). The experts were also asked to assess the
degree to which the proposed factors may affect strategic stability in 2022,
2026, and 2036.
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