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| 1 |
ID:
107568
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During its thirty-five years, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has been scarred by treaty violations, failed compliance negotiations, and ambiguous treaty language. Essentially a bruised paper tiger, the BWC adds no clarification to its distinction between biological activities for peaceful versus hostile purposes and has amplified-rather than lessened-mistrust in states' biological research and development potential. For the past two decades, these circumstances have generated multilateral annual discussions on BWC issues. From 2003 to 2010, intersessional talks centered on less controversial topics in an attempt to save the treaty from spiraling political tensions. States generally agree that this intersessional process was not futile and that it cooled some of the negative effects of the failed negotiations over a compliance protocol. At the upcoming Seventh BWC Review Conference this December, treaty members will weigh the utility of extending the process and its accompanying administrative Implementation Support Unit. The challenge will be to stimulate the evolution of the BWC beyond its hollow characterization to strengthen and inspire confidence in the treaty regime. This article examines the BWC's ambiguous language and how it has affected diplomacy, reflects on intersessional discussions, acknowledges the (limited) scope of appropriate peaceful activities that can be identified under the BWC, and addresses ways in which to reinvigorate the treaty.
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| 2 |
ID:
068604
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| Publication |
New York, Columbia University Press, 2005.
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| Description |
viii, 364p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0231133464
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051102 | 579.165/ZUB 051102 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
079713
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| 4 |
ID:
144292
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| Summary/Abstract |
The popular use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) can be understood to imply a relationship between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation insofar as it assumes that the separate weapons technologies can be usefully grouped into a single analytic category. This article explores whether WMD is actually a useful construct. It begins by reviewing the literature on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, including a recent study that sought to estimate the relationship between the pursuit and acquisition of these different weapons. It then explores some policy inferences that academics and policy makers may be tempted to draw from these studies, particularly regarding the Barack Obama administration's pursuit of deep nuclear reductions. It argues that many of these policy inferences are premature at best and misleading at worst. It concludes with a call for additional research into the causes and consequences of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and a call for scholars to remain cautious in their desire to draw premature policy implications from their studies in order to be “policy relevant.”
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| 5 |
ID:
107569
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has continued along a path of slow evolution since the 2001 collapse of negotiations for a verification protocol for the treaty. Over the last ten years, two intersessional programs of work, along with the Sixth BWC Review Conference, have resulted in the establishment of practices and institutions that strengthen treaty implementation mechanisms. In addition, developments external to the BWC-such as the revitalization of the UN secretary-general's investigation mechanism-have increased the range of mechanisms available to states to address challenges posed by biological weapons. The authors argue that incremental enhancements to the BWC offer the best route forward for the treaty and for the wider biological weapons prohibition regime. The authors identify short-, medium-, and longer-term proposals for such enhancements.
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| 6 |
ID:
109273
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| 7 |
ID:
062325
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Viva Book Publisher, 2005.
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| Description |
xviii, 413p.
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| Standard Number |
8130900807
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049653 | 327.174/LAR 049653 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
056158
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| 9 |
ID:
104998
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The military potential of nanotechnology was anticipated by its proponents from the early stages of its development, and explicit programmes for this purpose are now well established. However, the impact of nanotechnology on arms control is very unlikely to be merely additive. Instead, it threatens to undermine the arms control paradigm, for reasons explored in this paper. These include the place of nanoscience and nanotechnology as the principal enablers of technological convergence; the extension from dual-use to multiple-use dilemmas arising from new materials and processes, and their integration into economic development and competitiveness; low entry-level infrastructural requirements (already a feature of biotechnology); and a blurring of the distinction between offensive arms and capabilities likely to be viewed as threatening.
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| 10 |
ID:
020992
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| Publication |
2002.
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| Description |
48-59
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| 11 |
ID:
023355
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Jan/Feb 2003.
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| Description |
41-46
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| 12 |
ID:
131306
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| Publication |
Frankfurt, Peace Research Institute frankfurt, 2013.
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| Description |
iii, 41p.Pbk
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| Series |
PRIF Report No.120
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| Standard Number |
9783942532525
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057771 | 355.8/BEC 057771 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
061993
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| 14 |
ID:
105204
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses, via analysis of two case studies, the relationship between the dual-use nature of biological research and negative perceptions of the US biodefense program. The primary case study is the controversy over the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, an as-yet-unopened maximum-containment biodefense facility in Boston that some locals suspect will be used for illegal offensive biological weapons (BW) work. Lessons from this controversy are considered in the international context via a second case study: the Cold War-era Soviet bioweapons program, which was continued in part due to the Soviet belief that the US biodefense program was really a cover for offensive BW work. The two case studies demonstrate that misperceptions of US biodefense can have serious consequences that may threaten US national security. Underlying such misperceptions is the unavoidable dilemma of dual-use-legitimate peaceful research and technologies can overlap with offensive military activities. Politics play a critical role in determining outsiders' interpretations of the intent of US biodefense activities, transforming the dual-use dilemma from a descriptive concept into a problem in which misperceptions can be highly damaging. Taking into account the important role of political relations, the article argues that negative perceptions of the US biodefense program should not be simply accepted as a fait accompli, intrinsic to the dual-use nature of the life sciences, but rather that they can and should be addressed. The article identifies greater transparency measures as crucial to doing this.
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| 15 |
ID:
051321
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| Publication |
New York, Dell Publishing, 1999.
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| Description |
xi, 319p.
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| Standard Number |
0385334966
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048141 | 358.38/ALI 048141 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 16 |
ID:
055110
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| 17 |
ID:
115298
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nonproliferation policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons use are important, but insufficient, particularly in view of the rise of global terrorism. Given the history of developing and using these weapons, it is crucial that governments properly prepare for biological and chemical threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, such as by developing and managing effective healthcare infrastructure to mitigate widespread illness and injuries resulting from pandemics or terrorist attacks. Although the Middle East is one of the most sensitive and complex areas in the world-especially regarding regional arms control efforts and prevention-coordinating preparedness strategies among states in the region may be possible. Cooperatively addressing biological and chemical threats could lead to constructive progress towards the otherwise elusive goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.
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| 18 |
ID:
074947
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| 19 |
ID:
076351
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a climate of political concern about the deliberate dissemination of pathogenic micro-organisms, this article assesses the nature and scope of the threat to national security posed by actors other than states. Key factors include the motivations and disincentives for carrying out a biological attack and the technical challenges likely to be encountered by a non-state organization that decides to use disease as its weapon of choice. The assessment concludes that non-state organizations do not at present pose a great threat, that biological attacks should generally not be regarded as a 'WMD' issue, but also that the conduct of individual scientists engaged in pathogen research warrants careful monitoring.
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| 20 |
ID:
057631
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