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| 1 |
ID:
075727
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In September 2006 NATO's role in Afghanistan expanded to cover the whole of the country. With 32,000 troops under NATO command Stage 4 of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) represents an open-ended commitment to rebuilding a country long torn by war and instability. The Alliance's showpiece for advanced military transformation, the the NATO Response Force (NRF) represents a down payment on the future of transatlantic military co-operation. Taken together these two developments reflect the reality of NATO's new interventionism of an Alliance that bears little or no resemblance to that which won the Cold War. NATO today is an organisation designed for global reach and global effect, undertaking operations at their most robust. Unfortunately, the re-design of NATO's architecture has not been matched by a parallel development in Alliance military capabilities. NATO's big three, the US, Britain and France, have taken steps to improve their military capabilities. However, the transformation of NATO's other militaries has proved slow and uneven, leaving many members unable to fulfil any meaningful role. Thus, as NATO today plans for both robust advanced expeditionary warfare and stabilisation and reconstruction vital to mission success in complex crisis management environments a gap is emerging. Indeed, in an Alliance in which only the Americans can afford both military capability and capacity most NATO Europeans face a capability-capacity crunch, forced to make a choice between small, lethal and expensive professional military forces or larger, cheaper more ponderous stabilisation and reconstruction forces. This article explores the consequences of the crunch and the implications for NATO's current and future role as the Alliance struggles to find a balance between fighting power and staying power.
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| 2 |
ID:
075729
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article takes issue with the prevailing view that the ESDP capacity building process is easier and has been more successful in the civilian than in the military field. It argues that civilian capacity building is harder than military capacity building, demonstrates that the European Union's (EU's) civilian rapid reaction capacity is considerably smaller and less integrated than is generally assumed and that the capacity goals set for 2008 are unattainable. Yet another major EU expectations-capability gap has been created and there is now a real danger that this gap will seriously damage the EU's reputation as the global leader in civilian rapid reaction crisis management.
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| 3 |
ID:
075726
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper analyses the developing relations of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, both adapting to a new international security environment and building a network of interactions with each other. While the nature and functions of these two organisations remain different, their aims are becoming closer and new capabilities are being formed to achieve the same goals. The paper looks first at the declared level of cooperation with its benefits and limits, questioning whether this level corresponds to the practical one. It then envisages the modalities of EU-NATO practical cooperation in Bosnia and in the Western province of Sudan, Darfur.
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| 4 |
ID:
075730
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since its emergence in the late 1990s, the security sector reform model has come to be accepted as an indispensable element of democratic transitions and state-building projects. Europe has been an incubator for the concept, which is rooted in the notion of human security. While the model's normative framework has reached an advanced stage of development, it has produced few clear successes, revealing a 'conceptual-contextual divide'. Placed under new pressure due to a shift in security thinking following 11 September 2001, the model faces an identity crisis. The Afghanistan process, above all, has demonstrated the need for new debate in Europe and elsewhere on the direction and structure of the model.
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| 5 |
ID:
075731
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whilst the strategic and operational 'personalities' of states and international organisations are shaped by a wide range of variables, increasingly the structure and characteristics of the operational civil-military interface have become significant shaping factors in their own right. This has been driven by two interrelated processes: adaptations in the nature and objectives of international intervention operations and a repositioning of state and international organisations' assistance, military and political intervention strategies in relation to one another. These have generated a number of institutional and policy adaptations amongst several European states, NATO and the EU. This paper charts particularly significant or innovative changes within Denmark, the United Kingdom, NATO and the EU.
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| 6 |
ID:
075728
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of why various Norwegian governments of recent years have been willing to contribute to European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations and integrate into the ESDP structures despite their country's increasingly limited access to the decision-making and/or decision-shaping process in this policy area. Norway participates in most of the ESDP structures in one way or the other-it contributes with troops and personnel to ESDP operations, participates in a battle group and has an association agreement with the European Defence Agency. The result of Norway's will to integrate is that, as a non-member, it has become more integrated into the ESDP structures than members such as Denmark, who have chosen to opt out from this policy area. How can this be explained? Does the Norwegian government decide to participate because that is seen as the best way of pursuing Norwegian national interests, or are there other institutional or normative explanations for this policy choice?
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