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| 1 |
ID:
105909
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Two recent research programs-one on the sources of democratic consolidation and another on the causes and consequences of violent conflict-have tended to evolve in relative isolation. The contributions to this special issue of Journal of Conflict Resolution help to bridge this gap, through explicit theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between fighting and voting. Armed conflict and electoral politics may be strategic substitutes, in that political actors may optimally choose to submit to the ballot box or instead attempt to impose their will by force; or they may be strategic complements, in that actors use violence to bolster their electoral aims, or use electoral returns as sources of information on underlying preferences that they exploit in armed campaigns. In either case, the distribution of popular support for contending parties can shape not only the incidence but also the type of armed conflict, and it can also influence the incentives of parties to invest in institutional mechanisms that mitigate commitment problems and help to bring violent conflicts to an end. The contributions to this issue illuminate these themes and demonstrate the value of bringing these separate research programs into closer dialogue.
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| 2 |
ID:
115381
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| Publication |
Surrey, IHS Global Limited, 2012.
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| Description |
856p.
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| Standard Number |
9780710630100
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056831 | 623.7475/FOS 056831 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
135711
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| Publication |
Surrey, IHS Jane's, IHS Global Limited, 2014.
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| Description |
xxvi, 1025p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780710631282
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058029 | 623.7475/FOS 058029 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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| 4 |
ID:
149206
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| Publication |
Surrey, IHS Global Limited, 2016.
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| Description |
1117p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780710632111
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058887 | 623.7475/FOS 058887 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
088935
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the history of conflict and cooperation on the river Scheldt. Dutch-Flemish relations over the shared Scheldt estuary go back for centuries. Only in the past 10 years has there been intensive negotiation on a joint vision for its future which takes the form of a cooperative multi-stakeholder platform incorporating public, private and NGO representatives. Yet, relations have not always been cooperative; negotiations have been tense at times. After discussing the merits of a learning- versus a fighting-oriented analysis and capturing its dynamics in a TWINS matrix, this study proposes an approach that combines collaboration with competition, or learning and fighting. The case analysis finds that relations were often conflictual and cooperative simultaneously and warns against undue optimism about the multi-stakeholder process on the Scheldt estuary.
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| 6 |
ID:
100058
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| 7 |
ID:
075801
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In Hirshleifer's (1995) model for unitary actors, combined fighting/production abruptly breaks down when inter?group decisiveness of fighting is above a certain value (above one) or income requirements are not met. Accounting for the collective action problem, this article gives the opposite result that fighting/production is stable also for large decisiveness parameters (above one) and strict income requirements for each agent. The stable fighting/production equilibrium gets gradually easier to perturb off balance for high inter?group decisiveness, high costs of fighting, different fighting efficiencies, and equal group sizes. The equilibrium number of groups that can be sustained decreases in the inter?group decisiveness and increases in the cost of fighting.
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