|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
075859
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The refusal of the UN forces in Lebanon to accede to Israel's request to provide information on events they were witness to (the October 2000 abduction of three Israeli soldiers on the border), and the subsequent crisis between the two, are not unprecedented. A much more severe crisis broke out in 1960 after nearly the entire Egyptian army surprisingly deployed a few kilometres behind the UN Emergency Force's (UNEF) posts along the border with Israel in Sinai. Israel hurried to request UNEF to provide information-considered crucial to its survival-on this deployment, but was refused.
The author reviews this unknown incident and tracks on the diplomatic efforts made by the then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld alongside about UNEF's role and functions in this affair. He examines the UN's refusal and concludes that while the Egyptians did partially violate some informal understandings with the UNSG, it was indeed justified.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
075853
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
075854
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
For much of the nineteenth century, Canadian education-related international activities resided outside the realm of traditional diplomacy. This situation was exacerbated by Canada's colonial link with Great Britain. Obstacles that prevented educationalists from playing a more substantive role in diplomacy were local, imperial, and ecclesiastical in origin. Educational activities were also a tool in the service of governments in the era between the zenith of British Imperialism in the 1890s and the founding of the United Nations in 1945. In the post-1945 era there was greater collaboration between the federal Ministry of External Affairs and provincial ministries of education. Education also emerged in the late twentieth century as part of the new diplomacy. A flowering of new international governmental organizations dedicated to furthering creative diplomacy brought new energy to this field.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
075856
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 1963, George F. Kennan, diplomat and scholar, wrote a long letter of reminiscences about his experiences connected with the Spaso House mansion in Moscow, beginning with his arrival in Moscow in 1933 after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The text of the letter, with endnotes, is reproduced below. Ambassador Kennan returned to Spaso House in 1987, at the age of 83, and wrote that a "great abyss" now separated him from the Russia he had known a half-century earlier.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
075858
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In the history of NATO, lack of Atlantic communality is a recurring theme. Atlantic cohesion was constantly challenged. However, the discord among NATO members rarely threatened the very existence of the Alliance. The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed such a rare occurrence. In Europe the question of nuclear sharing triggered the development of blue-prints for a step-by-step replacement of the Atlantic security co-operation by a European Security Community. These blueprints were discussed among the EEC member-states and within the forum of the WEU. This study analyses not only those concepts, but also the role of the SACEUR, General Norstad, in defending NATO from external threats and internal decay. By studying the leeway of the SACEUR, this study tries to establish whether the subsystem of the international system, formed by the nations of the North Atlantic area after the Second World War, should be characterised as a system of hegemonic stability or as a pluralistic security community. The article is based on recently declassified archival material from both sides of the Atlantic.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
075857
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The present article is about Soviet perceptions of French politics and society as reported by the five Soviet ambassadors in Paris between 1924 and 1940, and about how their reports influenced Soviet policy making in Moscow. This article is based largely upon unpublished documents from the Soviet foreign policy archives in Moscow (AVPRF), specifically opened to researchers in the 1990s. It contends that these Soviet ambassadors established effective relationships with French counterparts and that they were pragmatic, non-ideological realists trying unsuccessfully to improve Soviet relations with France. The narrative is about the failure of these efforts over a period of sixteen years and ultimately about the failure of the Soviet Union and France to form anti-Nazi alliance during the 1930s
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
075855
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|