Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
119747
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
India's arms acquisition and technology absorption process remains skewed, even six decades after India's independent existence. It under mines the prefrences of the armed forces and remains overly titled in favour of the civilian technologists.The combination of a policy of autarky, distrust of the military, and the avowed objective of building an indigenous technology base and establishing self - reliance in military preparedness - these factors have together prevented the graduation from a distorted acquisition process to a structured one. Largly in the name of self - reliance, the technologists continue to reign over a regime that is known for its delay and cost over-runs rather than for providing anefficient of delivery. Belated attemts have been made to restore order in the overall state of affairs. However, the success of the technologists belonging to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), India's primary military Research and Development (R&D) agency, in one field - that of missile technology and missile defence - perpetuate this distortion in the system as a whole.
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2 |
ID:
118484
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3 |
ID:
087238
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The last three months have been really important for Brahmos Aerospace and the Indian Army. Brahmos tasted failure and success during these three months.
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4 |
ID:
106816
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5 |
ID:
154579
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6 |
ID:
129132
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Defense Department's chief weapons tester called in January for the redesign of a key component of the U.S. system intended to intercept long-range missiles launched from North Korea or Iran, raising questions about the department's plans to expand the current system. J. Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation, wrote in his annual report, released Jan. 29, that recent test failures of the U.S. ground-based interceptor (GBI) system raise concerns about the system's reliability and suggested that the missile's exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) be redesigned to assure it is "robust against failure." Echoing Gilmore's view, Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, told a Feb. 25 conference in Washington, "We've got to get to more reliable [missile defense] systems." Merely "patching the things we've got is probably not going to be adequate. So we're going to have to go beyond that," he said. The EKV plays a central role in the missile defense mission. It is lifted into space by a booster rocket and then uses its onboard sensors to locate an incoming enemy warhead and destroy it on impact. U.S. officials have compared the task to hitting a bullet with another bullet.
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7 |
ID:
008397
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Publication |
Oct 14, 1995.
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Description |
22
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8 |
ID:
112155
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
This essay is based on a close reading of speeches and other public statements made by Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev during their presidencies, covering the period 2000-2010. It argues that the pattern of presidential discourse reveals that both presidents have regarded Russia's nuclear weapons as primarily political rather than military instruments. Both Putin and Medvedev demonstrated a sustained desire to pursue strategic nuclear arms reductions through negotiations, particularly on a bilateral basis with the United States, and an interest in minimum nuclear deterrence. The shifts in position taken by both presidents on US plans for missile defence in particular reveal that they each attached as much, if not more, importance to Russia being regarded as an equal partner by the United States than to any strategic gains that might be achieved through preventing the deployment of an effective missile defence system.
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9 |
ID:
118147
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10 |
ID:
105145
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
Missile defence systems now offer the prospect of a technically feasible and strategically worthwhile defence, and the widespread proliferation of ballistic missiles means that their deployment is no longer a 'future issue'. They are attractive to today's great and emerging powers, as well as non-state actors who cannot compete on the conventional stage. Though it can deter, missile defence is not an alternative to deterrence - it is part of it.
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11 |
ID:
097609
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