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| 1 |
ID:
146436
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| Summary/Abstract |
A major Chinese narrative regarding the South China Sea is one of unreciprocated restraint. But Chinese leaders have clearly had an ambitious long-term vision of some sort, backed by years of efforts, themselves based on long-standing claims encapsulated in an ambiguous “nine-dash line” enclosing virtually all of the South China Sea
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| 2 |
ID:
085778
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The new U.S. maritime strategy embodies a historic reassessment of the international system and how the nation can best pursue its interests in harmony with those of other states. In light of the strategy's focus on building partnerships to better safeguard the global maritime commons, it is vital that American leaders clearly understand the frank and unvarnished views of allies, friends,
and potential partners. The strategy's unveiling at the Naval War College on 17 October 2007 with the leaders of nearly a hundred navies and coast guards present demonstrated initial global maritime inclusiveness.
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| 3 |
ID:
144536
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| Summary/Abstract |
US government reports describe Chinese-conceived “island chains” in the Western Pacific as narrow demarcations for Chinese “counter-intervention” operations to defeat US and allied forces in altercations over contested territorial claims. The sparse scholarship available does little to contest this excessively myopic assertion. Yet, further examination reveals meaningful differences that can greatly enhance an understanding of Chinese views of the “island chains” concept, and with it important aspects of China's efforts to develop as a maritime power. Long before China had a navy or naval strategists worthy of the name, the concept had originated and been developed for decades by previous great powers vying for Asia-Pacific influence. Today, China's own authoritative interpretations are flexible, nuanced and multifaceted – befitting the multiple and sometimes contradictory factors with which Beijing must contend in managing its meteoric maritime rise. These include the growing importance of sea lane security at increasing distances and levels of operational intensity.
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| 4 |
ID:
110523
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| 5 |
ID:
108218
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| Publication |
Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2010.
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| Description |
xxix, 529p.
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| Standard Number |
9781591142430, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056221 | 359.030951/ERI 056221 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
076051
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| 7 |
ID:
138699
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 3 September 2014, almost six years since Chinese warships first entered the Gulf of Aden to fulfill antipiracy duties, China Central Television (CCTV)–8 aired the first episode of “In the Gulf of Aden” . The multidozen-episode program, designed to “ignite raging patriotism” , given evening prime-time status, and attracting a popular audience with a star-studded cast, explores in dramatic fashion Beijing’s experience fighting modern piracy. Produced by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Political Department’s Television Art Center over three years, the series offers a unique window into how the PLAN has conducted its antipiracy mission and seeks to portray its experience to a Chinese audience.
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| 8 |
ID:
089781
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| Publication |
Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 2008.
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| Description |
xix, 485p.
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| Standard Number |
9781591143307
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054309 | 387.50951/COL 054309 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
079398
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| Publication |
Annapolis, US Naval Institute Press, 2007.
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| Description |
xvi, 412p.
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| Standard Number |
9781591143260
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 052589 | 359.930951/ERI 052589 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
077566
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| 11 |
ID:
127456
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE U.S. National Intelligence Council forecasts that China will become the world's largest economy (measured by purchasing-power parity) in 2022. Jane's predicts that by 2015 People's Liberation Army (PLA) funding will double to $238 billion, surpassing that of NATO's eight largest militaries after the United States combined. The International Institute for Strategic Studies says that China's defense spending might surpass America's as early as 2025. Even if these projections prove exaggerated, economic, technical and industrial activity of an amazing scope and intensity is already affording China potent military capabilities. This is especially the case when such capabilities are applied-most likely through peacetime deterrence, or a limited skirmish with a neighbor such as Vietnam-to the "near seas" (the Yellow, East China and South China Seas), currently a major Chinese strategic focus.
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| 12 |
ID:
062449
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| Publication |
Newport, Naval War college, 2005.
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| Description |
vi, 138p.
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| Series |
Naval war college Newport papers; 22
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049738 | 355.02170951/GOL 049738 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
086249
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2009.
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The People's Republic of China (PRC), no longer content with its longstanding 'minimalist' nuclear posture and strategy, is enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. Although the modernization of Chinese nuclear and missile forces may ultimately result in greater strategic deterrence stability, this change will not come about immediately or automatically. Indeed, it is entirely possible that China's growing missile capabilities could decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, especially in the event of a US-China conflict over Taiwan.
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| 14 |
ID:
114746
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the conventional missile component of the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery Force (SAF) has emerged as a centerpiece of China's accelerating military modernization program. The conventional missile force has grown in size and sophistication, and China has developed a doctrine for its employment. Chinese military publications emphasize that it plays an increasingly important role in deterrence and warfighting. In particular, Chinese sources underscore its role in achieving information dominance, air superiority, and sea control as well as countering third-party intervention. China's development of advanced conventional missile capabilities highlights the growing vulnerability of fixed bases and surface ships. Moreover, organizational tendencies, could fuel dangerous escalation. In response to these challenges, the United States must adapt its traditional approach to military operations and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.
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| 15 |
ID:
124888
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's limited transparency concerning its defence spending harms strategic trust, but foreign analysts often lose sight of important realities. Specific details remain unclear, but China's defence spending overall is no mystery - it supports PLA modernization and personnel development as well as its announced objectives of securing China's homeland and asserting control over contested territorial and maritime claims, with a focus on the Near Seas (the Yellow, East, and South China seas). This article offers greater context and perspective for Chinese and Western discussions of China's rise and concomitant military build-up through a nuanced and comprehensive assessment of its defence spending and military transparency.
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| 16 |
ID:
153322
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2012, China’s assertion of its sovereignty claim to the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has significantly raised the risk of a potentially escalatory political-military crisis with Japan. As circumstances worsen, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has championed major institutional reforms aimed at centralizing Japanese security policy decision-making and vastly improving crisis management. This article assesses these reforms’ significance for ameliorating Japan’s long-standing internal crisis management weaknesses, and enhancing its ability to communicate with Beijing promptly under challenging conditions. While significant issues remain, recent developments – especially the establishment of Japan’s first-ever National Security Council – demonstrate significant progress. Bilaterally, however, important firebreaks remain conspicuously absent.
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| 17 |
ID:
082541
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The PLA Navy (PLAN)'s capabilities in key areas (assets, trained personnel, experience) are currently insufficient to support long-range sea lanes of communication (SLOC) defense missions. With sufficient effort, Beijing may eventually overcome these obstacles, but it would probably also have to acquire some form of overseas basing access, which its foreign policy still proscribes. As it works to bridge this gap, China will use 'soft power' diplomacy, trade, humanitarian assistance, and arms sales to increase its influence in the region, thereby preserving the possibility of cooperation with major regional and international actors.
*The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not represent the estimates or policies of the US Navy or any other element of the US Government. The author is indebted to William Murray for his meticulous reviews of several earlier versions.
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| 18 |
ID:
143780
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| Summary/Abstract |
As China’s active assertion of its claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has increasingly crowded the surrounding waters and airspace with military and paramilitary forces, the risk of a Sino–Japanese crisis has reached unprecedented heights. Neither side wants conflict, but the increased frequency and proximity at which vessels and aircraft encounter one another means that overall risk has grown proportionately. Were a miscalculation or even an unintended low-level incident to occur, de-escalation would hinge on each side’s respective internal crisis management capabilities and political leaders’ ability to communicate expeditiously. This article analyzes China’s side of the ledger. Specifically, it assesses the extent to which institutional reforms since the 2001 US–China EP-3 crisis have ameliorated longstanding weaknesses in China’s crisis management capabilities and its ability to communicate via hotlines with Japan. While significant issues and obstacles to further urgently needed improvements remain, with the establishment of a Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and other recent reforms, Beijing may finally be achieving modest improvements. Bilaterally, however, no Sino–Japanese crisis hotline exists to date.
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| 19 |
ID:
086789
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) dispatched three naval vessels to support international counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in December 2008. This muscular effort is the clearest sign so far that Beijing is growing in its willingness and capacity to deploy military assets overseas to protect Chinese citizens and commercial interests.
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| 20 |
ID:
142803
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The term “counter-invention” has become burdened with conflated meanings and thus controversial in describing aspects of Chinese national and military strategy. Yet, the term should be retained although refined in two ways to help U.S. policymakers and planners devise appropriate responses to Chinese behavior aimed at undermining U.S. leadership in Asia.
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