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| 1 |
ID:
191728
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| Summary/Abstract |
Former US President Donald J. Trump was infamous for his nakedly transactional approach to politics. However, as we demonstrate in this article through the lens of migration politics, this kind of unabashedly transactional approach is less an outlier than a common feature of contemporary international politics. Drawing in part upon initial findings from our ongoing Diplomacy of Forced Migration Dataset Project, we explore historical and contemporary cases to illustrate how transactional migration management ‘deals’ such as the 2022 UK–Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership are not particularly new, unusual, or revolutionary. In this exploration of the long history of deal-making in the realm of forced migration management, we first define the phenomenon—which we term transactional forced migration (TFM)—and situate it within the growing literature on migration diplomacy, externalization and what is known as the instrumentalization and/or weaponization of migration. We then highlight illustrative historical precedents that presage what we are witnessing today. We additionally identify and unpack several of the under-appreciated connections between TFM schemes and other dimensions of diplomacy and international politics. We conclude with a summary of our argument, its implications for contemporary policy and a few thoughts about what current trends suggest the future is likely to hold.
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| 2 |
ID:
182932
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The world today is profoundly interconnected, but also characterized by ongoing national competition and intra-state conflict. At the nexus of these dynamics is the question of cross-border mobility, which cuts through and connects myriad, disparate areas of “entangled” security—from pandemics to climate change, to conflict and military engagement, to challenges to democracies in the form of internal polarization and external threats. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a striking illustration of this “global security entanglement” in action. This essay presents the concept of security entanglement, illustrates how it operates, and explores some of its theoretical and practical implications.
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| 3 |
ID:
076180
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a highly influential article in International Security, Stephen Stedman introduced a model of "civil war spoilers," which focused valuable attention on the generally underappreciated role of elites in determining the course of negotiations and in implementing intrastate peace accords. For all its virtues, however, the spoiler model did not suggest the best set of strategies for deterring or defeating those who might seek to undermine peace processes. This is because context-specific and actor-specific measures tend to affect diplomatic instruments only at the margin and because, while spoiler type does not change over time, actors' commitment to fulfilling the provisions of peace accords often does; thus these static characteristics cannot be the critical variables the spoiler model suggests they are. Instead, as a detailed reexamination of three of Stedman's case studies (i.e., Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia) demonstrates, a capabilities-based model offers a more parsimonious and generalizable explanation for why, when, and under what conditions actors who seek to undermine the peace will emerge or retreat. As such, the real key to deterring and defeating would-be spoilers lies in the possession and exercise of the material power to coerce or co-opt them, rather than in the capacity to discern their true character or personality type.
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| 4 |
ID:
157361
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rumors run rife in areas affected by political instability and conflict. Their adoption plays a key role in igniting many forms of violence, including riots, ethnic conflict, genocide, and war. While unverified at the time of transmission, some rumors are widely treated as truth, while others are dismissed as implausible or false. What factors lead individuals to embrace rumors and other forms of unverified information? This article presents a new theoretical framework for understanding individual receptivity to rumors and tests it using original survey data gathered in insurgency-affected areas of Thailand and the Philippines. We find wide variation in rumor adoption, and argue that three factors drive individuals to embrace rumors: worldview, threat perception, and prior exposure. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no evidence that commonly cited factors—including education, income, age, and gender—determine individual receptivity to rumors. We also explore the implications of belief in rumors on conflict dynamics. We find that greater receptivity to rumors correlates with the belief that ongoing conflict is intractable. This suggests that rumors can not only help spark political violence, but also impede its resolution. Our findings shed light on the complex interaction between worldview and unverified information in shaping popular beliefs—and through them, political contention and competition—in conflict areas and beyond.
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| 5 |
ID:
080774
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, it has been widely argued that a new and different armament - i.e., the refugee as weapon - has entered the world's arsenals. But just how new and different is this weapon? Can it only be used in wartime? And just how successful has been its exploitation? Using a combination of statistical data and case study analysis, this article tackles these questions and provides a detailed examination of the instrumental manipulation of population movements as political and military weapons of war. In addition to 'mapping the terrain' of the issue by providing a comprehensive typology of the most common means by - and desired ends for - which displaced persons have been used as political and military weapons since the end of the Cold War, the author also provides a portrait of the identities of the kinds of actors most likely to engage in this kind of exploitation. She also proposes an explanation for what motivates them to resort - and apparently increasingly so - to the use of this unconventional policy tool, despite the reputational and potential retributive costs of doing so.
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