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| 1 |
ID:
108615
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| 2 |
ID:
190102
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how specific characteristics of defense intelligence affect the relationship between intelligence producers and their clients in a manner that is different from prevailing conceptualizations commonly found in civilian intelligence organizations. To do so, the paper first addresses some important distinguishing characteristics of defense intelligence. These include the embedded character of defense intelligence agencies in military organizations, specific military cultural traits and the mixture of military and civilian personnel. Based on literature study and desk research, the paper then identifies three producer-client paradigms: I) distance versus closeness, II) the ideal of analytic objectivity, and III) intelligence lays the foundation for decision-making. Confronting these paradigms with the characteristics of defense intelligence, we find that defense intelligence producer-client relations are more multifaceted, layered and networked than commonly explained.
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| 3 |
ID:
076353
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the modern era, almost all intelligence professionals will study the Intelligence Cycle as a kind of gospel of how intelligence functions. Yet it is not a particularly good model, since the cyclical pattern does not describe what really happens. Policy officials rarely give collection guidance. Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel. Finally, the idea that decision makers wait for the delivery of intelligence before making policy decisions is equally incorrect. In the modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligence to support policy rather than to inform it. The Intelligence Cycle also fails to consider either counter-intelligence or covert action. Taken as a whole, the cycle concept is a flawed model, but nevertheless continues to be taught in the US and around the world.
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